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THE PERFECT COUNTRY.*

As a boy I was convinced that my own was a perfect country. I assumed it as a matter of course. I never doubted that it was. My first shock came when I heard a crotchety old uncle constantly decrying it and saying how much better things were done abroad—how much better the cooking was in France, how much more tasteful the French were. Then, as I grew older, I read in the papers and heard in sermons of the crying needs for reform in various directions in our own country. So, though my country might be better than any other country, it evidently was not yet perfect.

As a man I spent many years in India, in travelling through China, Mongolia, Turkestan and Tibet, and for political purposes had to study these countries carefully, and in the case of India to take part in the administration. Naturally, too, in the course of my political activities I heard my own country subjected to the sharpest criticisms, and compared favourably or unfavourably with Russia, Germany, France or America. And being in some small measure responsible for guiding one or other Indian States there, of necessity, rose in my mind the desire to know what was the perfect country which we should aim at being like. Giving up my boyish belief in my own country's perfection, was France, for instance, any more perfect, or America?

FRANCE had had her revolution. She had tried Monarchy, she had tried Empire, she had tried Republicanism. Was she now the perfect country? America had fought herself free of her homeland and started life new in a new land. Was she the perfect country?

I COULD hardly admit that either France or America were absolutely perfect. There was indeed no actually existing country—neither Switzerland, nor Sweden nor Denmark—which could be regarded as perfect.

I MUST turn then to ideals. Could I find a perfect ideal country to which anyone could strive to make his own conform? I tried to find one. But here also I failed. I could not find even an ideal country that was perfect in my eyes.

* A luncheon-hour address in All Hallows Church, Lombard Street; being one of three addresses on the sociological basis of society, the other two addresses being by Professor Hobhouse (EVILS OF CIVILISATION), and by Mr. Victor Branford (THE IDEAL SOCIETY).

WILLIAM MORRIS, in "News from Nowhere," drew a picture of a very delightful England—and especially delightful for any one of Morris's own particular temperament and views. But there was one fatal flaw in the picture. It left out of account other countries. Morris wrote of his own country as if it stood in no relation to other countries and could become what it liked irrespective of what other countries were and were becoming. He did not envisage his own country as one of a closely interconnected community of countries. And he gave no inkling that it had to take its share in the general work of the world.

THIS particular error of omission the Communists do not commit in forming their ideal. They do recognise the connectedness of countries. They take a world view. But what they gain in width they seem to me to lose in height. The level is their ultimate ideal. First there is to be a dictatorship of the proletariat and when all capitalists and petty bourgeois like myself have been reduced to the level of the masses there is to come into being a class-less society where all are equal and all are free.

NOW most men are ready to die for their country in a good cause. But I, for one, would not care to be forcibly deprived of what I value and compelled to live an uncongenial life in order that at some future date my country might become something neither desirable nor possible. For how is any society possible without gradation? At least there are the experienced and the inexperienced, the young and the old, the strong and the weak, the clever and the stupid, the generous and the niggardly, the affectionate and the callous; and all this involves gradation and in the long run classes. Look where we will, in physical nature, among plants, among animals, among men, we find gradation, never the dead level. The whole impulse of things seems to be away from the level and towards gradation. In physical nature we have the ultimate particles of matter associating themselves together to form atoms, atoms forming molecules, and molecules forming chemical compounds. And the compound is higher than the molecule, the molecule than the atom, and the atom than the electron. Similarly, we have plants on a high level like the rose, and plants on a low level like a moss; animals on a high level like the apes, and animals on a low level like the worms; and, among men, we have men on a high level like the clever, industrious and artistic Chinese, and men on a low level like the aboriginal tribes of Australia. Even in America, which is dedicated to the proposition that all men are equal, I noticed signs of gradation everywhere. The people were not all on the same level either of material wealth, or of intellectual wealth, or of spiritual wealth. Some were on a high level materially but on a low level sprititually. Others were on a high level spiritually but on a low level materially.

GRADATION seems to me to be inherent not only in human nature but in nature as a whole. I have not the least expectation therefore that

the Communists, try as ardently and as courageously and as persistently as they may, will ever succeed in establishing a class-less—that is an ungraded level-society.

Nor do I think it desirable that they should, even if they could. The Russians are accustomed to great level plains. But most people sigh for a rise. The minutest hill is a relief. And a society in which no one rose an inch above his fellows would drive most of us mad. We all want some one to admire, some one to kindle emulation in us. It would be hard never to have anyone to look up to.

And while Communists have sufficient width of vision to look beyond their own country, and try to embrace the whole of mankind, yet they go no further. They have no conception of mankind as born out of the Universe, and therefore partaking of the nature of the Universe, being imbued with its spirit and having to act in accordance with that spirit—or in other words having to do the will of God. They are atheists. They make war on religion. It is, they say, a superstition which education will clear away. It is an opiate for the people. The universe is a machine and nothing more, and man can make his own way without any reference to a God.

But here precisely is the difficulty. The cleverest and most determined men, and all the cleverest and most determined men combined, and acting together, cannot go against the nature of the Universe, any more than an individual man, however clever and determined, can go against his own nature. A man might, for example, like to work for a whole month straight on end, night and day, without eating, drinking, or sleeping, or going backwards and forwards to London—he might like to do this in order that he might, at the end of the month, go off for two months' holiday and enjoy himself. But he can do nothing of the sort. He has to act in accordance with his nature without much deviation from it. He may eat and drink a little less or a little more, work for six hours or work for ten hours a day, sleep for seven hours or sleep for nine, but he cannot err very far from either side of a mean. And he has also to act roughly in accordance with the nature of his country. Seeing some cool refreshing turf on a summer day he would like to walk upon it, but he is deterred by the notice " Keep off the Grass." Being loyal and seeing his Sovereign at a football match he would like to walk up to him and shake him heartily by the hand, but he would be told that this is not done—no Sovereign could survive if at any time any one of his millions of subjects could shake him by the hand. He might want to give all his goods to feed the poor but the tax collector would come round and want a large proportion of those goods for carrying on the government of the country. He might want to stop comfortably at home and look after his garden or play golf, but he would be sent off to endure the

most fearful hardships, suffer the most terrible agonies and risk his very life in the service of his country in a war against some other country.

AND as a man has in the main to act in accordance with the nature of his country, so must he, and so must his country, act in general accordance with the nature of the universe as a whole out of which every man and every country has sprung. Under penalty of death there are prescribed limits within which men have to keep. We cannot go beyond them. We have a certain latitude of choice, but in the main we must conform to the Spirit of the Universe—to that drive which is impelling the whole and propelling it forward.

AND what is the general character of that impulse? We can easily tell, for it is acting in each one of us and in all we see around us. And what do we find when we look within ourselves? And in what direction do we feel ourselves urged? We certainly feel impelled to provide for our body—to supply it with food, clothing and shelter. But we also have strong spiritual impulses as well. We crave for fellowship, for the love of those about us and also of animals. It was indeed upon love that we were dependent from the very first. Long before we could supply ourselves with food and clothing and shelter they were supplied for us by our fellows—our parents and others about us. We crave, too, for beauty. As children we rushed to pick flowers, and we loved pretty pictures and hearing sweet music and listening to fairy tales. Our thirst for truth was just as insatiable. We asked unceasing questions about the why and the how and the wherefore of things. And we loved to play, too. We loved the enjoyment of exercising our faculties and sharpening our wits against one another, competing with one another; and we exulted in our prowess. And here again, as with our material needs so also with our spiritual necessities—they were lavishly provided for us while we were young. Unstinted love was showered on us. Many a thing of beauty was given us. Play for us was arranged. And if not all our questions were answered, at least we were sent to school and given the means of finding the truth of things for ourselves.

AND as we grow up and have to fend for ourselves we still want all these spiritual good things of life as well as the material necessities of food, clothing, and shelter. We want scope for the full exercise of all our faculties, scope for enjoying the company of our fellows, scope for play, scope for enjoying and creating beauty in form or colour or sound or manner, scope for discovering the truth of things, and scope for satisfying the highest aspirations of the soul. We have vague visions of a love and a beauty far surpassing anything we know of here, and we yearn towards it.

AND as we come to have others dependent on us—our fellow-men dependent on us, our children dependent on us—we slowly realise

how dependent we ourselves have been and still are upon the world about us. We have to provide food and clothing and shelter for our family as well as for ourselves. But unless the tillers of the soil worked we should have no food. We are dependent on the tillers of the soil then. But they, too, are dependent on the earth and the sun and the rain bringing the grain to maturity. So with all our independence we have also a strong sense of dependence. But with our insistence, our own individuality we have a strong sense of sociality. And the drive we feel within us is towards making together with our fellows for the enjoyment of the best things in life. We admire and strive to emulate those who are capable of enjoying or expressing or creating these best things; and as we like to help along little children, so do we like to help those less fortunately endowed than ourselves to enjoy what we enjoy.

THIS urge to perfection and longing to help others towards perfection is then the chief characteristic of the spirit of the Universe as we feel it within ourselves. Driving through us and through the world about us is the mighty impulse towards more devoted love, richer beauty and fuller truth—and towards something diviner still which we cannot describe in words but dimly feel in our souls. And this highest of all is what is at the very centre of the spirit and is the driving power of the whole.

IT is in accordance with this Spirit that, whether we wish it or no, we have in the main to work. For to transgress it is destruction, as upon it we are dependent not only for our very lives but for all that makes life most worth living. So obviously that will be the most perfect country which is most fully informed with this Spirit and most closely conforms to it. The perfect country will be continually perfecting itself—and perfecting itself in conformity to an ideal which it is likewise continually perfecting. In other words, it will be perpetually striving better to know and act upon the will of God.

IT will be no class-less country in which all are on a dead level of dull uniformity. It will be a steeply graded society. But it will be a country so fluid in its structure that those on the lowest grade—as we all are when we first come into the world—will be given not only opportunity but strong help and ardent encouragement to rise to the very highest—a country in which the highest grades will be occupied by those of highest spiritual worth, who will be so sensible of their utter dependence on every grade below them, so devoted to their fellow-country men, so keen that their country should play a great part in the general work of the world, that they will bend all their best energies to imbuing the whole with the highest spirituality at their command and hastening by every means the progression of lower to higher and highest.

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS.

THERE are writers on sociology who use the formula FOLK, WORK, PLACE as expressive of the fundamental social relation. No doubt the formula has immense sociological importance. Strictly, however, it is, I think, not a sociological but an economic formula. The corresponding, though inadequate, formula for sociology seems to me to be FOLK, THOUGHT, CULTURE (PSYCHICAL ENVIRONMENT), the last including of course both free and comparatively fixed elements such as institutions.[1] This comment may suggest the question whether sociology and economics should properly be regarded as distinct sciences. There is perhaps a certain liberty in the matter. It may even be legitimate to treat what are called the philosophical sciences, those namely the methods of which are to a large extent introspective and apriori, as all parts of one general science of mind. But there is, I think, more both of truth and of convenience in a classification that discards this unitary conception. And according to the same criteria sociology and economics may be best treated as independent sciences. It is true that actually the sociological and economic aspects of society are very intimately blended. But the blending is even more intimate in the case of sociology and psychology, which are generally held to be distinct sciences. The question then arises how are sociology and economics to be distinguished, what is the proper sphere of each. The distinction that I would propose is as follows. First, economics is concerned with certain relations between the community and its material environment, the latter including even the living material environment—cattle for instance or horses or slaves—so far as it is valued either for its material properties or for its serviceability in connexion with the rest of the material environment. Sociology on the other hand is concerned with the relations between the community and its cultural environment. This distinction however needs qualifying. First it should be noted that economics also takes account of the prevailing culture so far as it has an economic character or aspect. But the relation is different. Culture, which in sociology constitutes the environment, in economics belongs rather, as psychical equipment, to the community itself except in so far as it has received material embodiment.[2] Conversely, sociology also takes account of the material or rather the physical environment, but, directly at least, only as "nature," that is in respect of its cultural, non-economic aspects, scenery for instance. Sociology is concerned also with social

[1] Institutions may perhaps be regarded as the sociological analogue of plant and fixed capital generally.

[2] To some extent animals and still more slaves might have to be regarded as psychical rather than material equipment.

relations resulting from primary social needs and impulses, and so far pre-cultural.[3]

It was said above that economics treats of certain, not all, relations between community and material environment. The distinction I would make is that economics considers the material environment so far as modified, utilised, controlled or capable of being so handled. Beyond this the material environment cannot furnish economic wealth and does not come within the sphere of economics. Further, economics considers material as, so to say, humanised or humanisable but only in respect of its material properties. When the features prized in a material object have only a slight relation to its material properties, as with a painting or again an autograph, then these features must be regarded as only to a slight extent constituting economic wealth, even though they now and then fetch large prices.[4] Besides the moulding of the material environment by man economics considers the converse moulding of man by the environment so far as it affects and is affected by the former process. This moulding is now mainly psychical (in its better features educative) and, where it affects the community as such rather than the individual, even social and cultural. Once however it may have been to a greater extent physical or rather organic, in line so far with the evolutionary organic moulding of the animal world and in fact forming the climax thereof.

The above consideration brings us to the confines of economics and evolutionary biology, and it may therefore be not out of place here to note briefly the relation between the two sciences. I cannot say whether this relation has ever been emphasised; but its importance is shown in the fact that the theory of natural selection was suggested both to Darwin and to Wallace in part by the speculations of the economist Malthus.[5] There is in animal societies a certain amount of true economics as there is also of true sociology, and this holds perhaps even where the social foundation is mainly instinctive, as with the hymenoptera. But for the most part the relations of animals to their environment are only quasi-economic or pre-economic. On a general survey of such relations there are, one may say, on the one

[3] It might perhaps be objected that all culture, except where of a supernatural order, arises from the relation between man and his physical environment, so that the formula quoted at the commencement holds good equally for sociology and economics. My answer would be that though all culture has thus originated, such physical environment to a very great extent has been that of other places and other times, the culture of which has been either imported or preserved and handed down.

[4] I cannot help thinking that economists have possibly made the idea of market-value too fundamental, also that this perhaps has both obscured the relation of economics to other sciences and has had some influence in the undue exaltation of competition as an economic factor in comparison with cooperation.

[5] Similarly the view of the same authors regarding the importance and efficiency of the struggle for existence must have been influenced by the then prevailing view of the place of competition in the economic world.

hand fundamental organic wants and an organic equipment, sometimes highly developed, and even a little use of rudimentary tools, and there are on the other hand the means of subsistence—food and shelter. But there is not much moulding of the environment, hence not much production of anything that can properly be called wealth and, though here and there considerable division of labour, nothing, I suppose, that can properly be described as exchange. Again, whereas historic man and especially civilised, inventive man has more moulded than been moulded organically by the material environment, the animal world on the contrary has rather been moulded thereby. About the nature and extent of the latter process there is of course much difference of opinion. According to the theory of natural selection the process has been quite indirect, according to the Lamarckian theory it has been much less so, while any theory of orthogenetic or otherwise innate tendencies could allow to external factors, direct or indirect, only a partial influence.

NEXT concerning the primary relation in sociology and economics respectively. Here we must start from psychology. The behaviour of the individual organism, from amoeba to man (in some sense one may say to society) in relation to its environment, understood in the broadest sense, may be said to consist of two main phases, stimulus and response or, as perhaps it might be better put, impression and expression (self-expression) respectively; in the case of man there may be, though it is exceptional, an intermediate phase of deliberate, free choice (self-determination), which however is not important in this connexion. The direct economic relation, the relation, that is, where there is contact with the material, is of the above character. The essence of social intercourse on the other hand consists, I think, in this that the expression of one person becomes the impression of others or, more correctly, produces more or less corresponding impressions in others; in a true, though looser sense one may say the same of the intercourse between communities. While therefore in economics the fundamental relation is that between impression and resulting expression, both in the same person, in sociology it is that between the expression of one person and the resulting impressions of others. The former is, in one sense, an immediate, the latter usually a mediated relation, effected through the medium of naturally or conventionally expressive symbolisms—I say *usually* because telepathic communication may be an exception. To exemplify now the sociological relation, a work of art for the artist is primarily an expression, for viewers or hearers or readers it is primarily an impression—I use the word *primarily* because only in the most elementary processes are impression and expression mutually exclusive. Artistic creation, like every reaction to the environment, is primarily expressive, having the relation of a collective expression

to the many impressions in which the idea of it originated ; but within it are comprised innumerable minor psychical processes complete in themselves, that is, composed of an experiential or impressive and a responsive or expressive phase. It should also be noted that the correspondence between the expression of one person and the impression of another may be very partial where personalities or circumstances differ greatly. It would for instance usually be quite partial between an expression signifying " I am preparing to kill him " and an impression signifying " He is preparing to kill me." Much activity of course is socio-economic. When the economic character is primary the unit-process will be of the impression-expression type ; when the sociological character is primary it will be of the expression-impression type. Of a somewhat special character are those cases where the economic material is alive—animal or human—for in such cases economic and sociological relations are likely to be particularly involved.

So far I have considered the relations between sociology and economics in their permanent aspect. But they also present an important aspect of change. The differentiating tendencies that till quite recently have generally characterised the development of civilisation are well exemplified in the divergent development of social and economic activity and organisation, some features of which may be noted here. In medieval society this development had made little way ; manor, gild, borough for instance were socio-economic units. But in modern times such identity or correspondence has disappeared almost entirely. And this change, supplemented by others, some similar in character, the differentiation of political and, in the narrower sense, sociological units and so forth, some rather different and more special, for instance the industrial revolution, has resulted in universal disruption. During medieval times not only were units such as those instanced above very real units with a real common-life ; there was also a systematic and organic connexion and continuity stretching from the individual and the family through the manor to the fief or again through the craft or gild to the borough and thence to the shire, from the shire to the kingdom and thence again in some measure, though perhaps not in the measure sometimes assumed or imagined by medieval legists and idealists, to Christendom generally. But in modern civilisation, while there are plentiful associations of the most diverse kinds, there is apart from the nation no effective unit living a common-life. Perhaps even the nation is not really such a unit, and it may be a sense of the deficient integration of national life that has prompted patriotism to create those emblematic, semi-mythological figures, *England*, *Deutschland*, *la France* and so forth, to serve as centres of common devotion and common inspiration. This socio-economic disintegration, together with the general disintegration prevailing in modern civilisation, should, I think, yield in the future, so far as that civilisation continues

to develop on progressive lines, is indeed even now beginning to yield, to a complementary process of reintegration. But it may be long before the latter process gets well under way, and in the meantime the dearth of systematic communal connexions, resulting in such a fact for instance as that, especially in the upper social grades, neighbourhood as a social factor is almost non-existent, or that the persons with whom we come into sensible contact in daily life are for the most part strangers, standing in no known relation to us, must be a source of cultural weaknesses and deficiencies that will perhaps obtain greater attention when sociology reaches a stage in which it will be engaged less with description and more with explanation. I cannot profess any acquaintance with the regionalist movement; but in so far as it is directed to providing some substitute for the social connexions lost through the breakup of the old socio-economic system it is, I should say, excellently inspired.

FINALLY, a few words about the relation of sociology and economics respectively to psychology, which may be said to occupy in some degree a central position among the various philosophical sciences. Psychology, unlike sociology and in part economics, considers primarily not the group but the individual, and it considers the individual as experiencing and responding to and so developing in connexion with the environment generally, not with a particular feature or aspect thereof.[6] The sociological environment, however, being a great deal richer than the economic, there is a corresponding difference in their relations with psychology. Indeed, economics at a certain stage of its development, when it was tending, as every kind of knowledge at one time does, to become a pure specialisation, could get along passably with that fragment—some would say that figment—of human nature, the "economic man."

P. J. HUGHESDON.

EDITORIAL NOTE ON SOCIOLOGY AND ITS RELATED SCIENCES.

WE welcome Mr. Hughesdon's article as a contribution to the study of the inter-relations of the Social Sciences, as also of Biology and Psychology to Sociology. But a qualifying note is needed, more especially as reference has sometimes been made here, perhaps confusingly, to the "Place, Work, Folk formula" when the implied schematization in its entirety is meant.

WHILE the study of WORK (and developed activities), and PLACE (extending to the world) has developed into the separate sciences of Economics and Geography, that of FOLK has equally developed into Ethnography, or Anthropology. Here then are three specialised studies which, if integrated, or, as one might say, "con-specialised," would furnish the systematic approach to a simple objective sociology, say, sociology No. I. But as

[6] The subject-matter of psychology has been authoritatively but diversely said to be "consciousness," "experience," "behaviour." May I suggest "human nature in its psychical aspect" or, more briefly, "personality"?

PLACE, WORK, FOLK, have each their subjective aspect, so there is needed a more subjective sociology or a simple psycho-sociology; call it No. II. Yet a psycho-sociology No. III. emerges with the more affirmative or creative aspects of mental and social life viewed integrally; and a sociology No. IV. when this subjective life of creative activity reacts purposively and integrally upon the concrete world of people, affairs and places. Condensing the detailed analyses and re-syntheses of two recent papers ("A proposed Co-ordination of the Social Sciences," SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, January, 1924, and "The Charting of Life," SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, January, 1927), we get a schema of the above four sociologies presented in outline as a unified field embracing and co-ordinating the relevant sub-sciences of the social process, itself viewed as parallel to, and interacting with, the life-process and the mind-process.



(I.) PLACE, WORK and FOLK are the fields of Geography, of Economics and of Anthropology, at their simplest expressions. Though each must specialise it must be in "Con-Specialisation," in which geography may be called fundamental, economics central, anthropology supreme. Hence the value of thus setting them down in their natural relationship. In still simpler form, as ENVIRONMENT, FUNCTION, ORGANISM, this is the formula of the biologist who wishes to bear in mind the relations of his organisms to their environment: it is even that of the student of the physical sciences who wishes to bear in mind the action of life upon matter through the expenditure of their own vital energy.

(II.)—is the field of a simple psycho-sociology, experimental, may be, in practice and related to physiology and biology. The first response of Folk to each other (as with all creatures of one kind) is one of *FEELING*; their acquirement from Work is of course *EXPERIENCE*; their impressions of their world, their Place, is gained through *SENSE*.

(III.) In (III.), *EMOTION, THOUGHT IMAGINATION*, we pass from a passive subjective psycho-sociology, which might be called objective-subjective, to one still subjective, but actively, even creatively, so.

(IV.) At last in (IV.), ETHO-POLITY, SYNERGY, ACHIEVEMENT, the subjective or psychic life re-emerges into the concrete world towards refashioning it in terms of a purposive inner life. The primitive FOLK, no longer responding directly merely to the first prompting of animal *FEELING* are now a group whom *EMOTION*, "religious and loyal," have bounded together anew, they are a POLITY in some measure ETHICAL. Their WORK and its *EXPERIENCE* reintegrated by

THOUGHT **has co-ordinated itself into SYNERGY. And the PLACE, no longer merely *SENSED*, has been re-*IMAGINED* in a new Transformation the measure of whose attainment is the concrete ACHIEVEMENT.**

It will be noted that we have avoided the phrase "Psychic Environment" which, though sometimes a useful metaphor, would be confusing here, where it is best to keep Environment to its strict, concrete biological use. "Culture" is, in its original and perhaps most dynamic and vital sense, the tending or care of spiritual growth or evolution, individual or social, and the adaptation of society, of "ways" and of environment for that evolution. Relating it to our diagram, "Culture" might be used (*a*) for the cycle from (I.) by (II.) and (III.) to (IV.), and (*b*) for the wave-like recurrence, cycle on cycle, which goes on through history and human evolution.

Thus the above diagram or schema serves as the formula of a comprehensive sociology which is also a synthesis of life. In it biology is latent, geography, economics and primitive anthropology take their due place, but the higher manifestations of life, which are the special fields of ethics, psychology and æsthetics, clearly emerge in due order. For substantion of the latter contention, a supplementary reference may be made to an editorial paper "Scientific and Philosophic Vision" (Sociological Review, October, 1922, and particularly to pp. 295-9), which was prepared as an introduction to the Oxford Conference on "The Correlation of the Social Sciences." For summary presentation of current views as to the correlation, or lack of correlation, between the social sciences, references may be made to the Abstracts of Papers read at the Oxford Conference (Sociological Review, January, 1923); and also to the symposium on the subject printed in Sociological Papers, Vol. I., 1904. The first systematic presentation of the view taken in this Editorial Note will be found in two papers by Professor Geddes on "Civics as Applied Sociology," printed in Sociological Papers, Vols. I. and II., 1904 and 1905.

MONTESSORI AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.[1]

"ANYONE who is seriously bent on personal fulfilment or on social or national reforms must discover sooner or later that all questions relating to these matters come down to the single problem of life-renewal. The liberation of the native vigour, richness and enjoyment of life, *i.e.*, of actual living, is at once the beginning and end of every such effort; it is the goal at which we aim; and is at the same time the only certain means by which we can make even the smallest advance.

WHO does not view the social life of to-day, and his own life too, as externally narrowed and oppressed; and as inwardly discordant and atrophied? Who does not ask for a freer, healthier and fuller life, both for himself and for his region and people? Is any study to be undertaken more earnestly than that of life-renewal, or is there any which promises more glorious results?" (SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW. January, 1927. "The College of Renewal: A New Year's Message": by G. Sandeman. p. 1.)

"PREVENTION is better than cure. We have not merely to re-educate ourselves, we have to see to it that the coming generations do not repeat our errors. Our wish is that our children should get to understand life—that is, the relation between man and the world. Very well: let them begin by getting into relation with the immediate part of the world about them. And this they will do for themselves to a large extent if allowed to." (HEALTH AND CONDUCT: by Dr. A. J. Brock. pp. 260-261.)

I AM not going to hazard a definition of "social progress." But, if we take as the ideal we aim at for the individual the old motto, "a sound mind in a sound body," perhaps we may say that the social progress we desire is in the direction of having sound and sane individuals in a sound and sane community, and sane communities in a sane world. A sane community, I take it, would be a fraternal community. A sane world would be a fraternal world—that is, all the world living as one happy family.

Is there such progress, or any hope of it? Bear with me for a few minutes while we take a glance at our present world; and I pray you to be indulgent if my views do not quite coincide with yours.

IT seems that the optimism of the nineteenth century in regard to human progress has in this century been giving way to doubts as to whether the world does progress quite as steadily as was thought. And certainly in this century we have been receiving some shocks. But, quite irrespective of those shocks, a comparison, say, with the Greeks of some 24 or 25 centuries ago does not conduce to complacency. As has, no doubt, been pointed out many a time, we can hardly claim sounder bodies, or even sounder minds, than those of the Greeks of "classical" times—if as sound. But that very fact, it seems to me, brings out in stronger relief one important factor in the sound mind in which we surely may claim to have improved even

[1]Revised from a lecture delivered in Edinburgh, Glasgow and Falkirk.

upon the Greeks, and that is sympathetic imagination, or, let us say shortly, sympathy. I think we may justly claim to have a wider and more sensitive sympathy than had any ancestors or predecessors of whom we have read in history. I say advisedly, " of whom we have read in history," for I am not sure whether in this respect we have made any advance, for instance, on some of those primitive peoples, found by Alfred Russel Wallace in the Malay Archipelago, who knew no war, whose chiefs seemed to be almost purely honorary or nominal. And then one remembers how, even towards the end of last century, the Burmans of a certain locality, as related in that interesting book, THE SOUL OF A PEOPLE, refused to use the conveyances of a diligence company because they considered that the horses were ill-treated. Still, with possible reservations, I think we can confidently assume that mankind has progressed in this quality of sympathy, surely an important factor in social progress. We even treat some kinds of cruelty to animals (alas ! only some kinds) as crimes. Not that that is a good way of dealing with the matter, but doubtless it is a sign that a habit of more sensitive sympathy has in some measure permeated the body politic. And I think this is the main line along which progress has moved—that and a changed outlook on natural phenomena, our permeation with a faint leaven of the scientific mind.

BUT if we have so decidedly grown in sympathy does not that make all the more remarkable the fact that we still tolerate so much of " man's inhumanity to man "—that, for instance, we still permit destitution by the side of excessive riches. In this respect, instead of progressing, we would seem to have regressed from much earlier times. For I suppose it would not be far from the truth to say that with most primitive peoples if some go short all go short together ; whereas with us a considerable section of the population always keeps well above the poverty line, leaving others to go short. And there are always many who do go short. With us a partial famine is continuous (except when there is a very great war on. Then the famine is stayed in the land.) Yet so enormous are our powers of production that obviously it would be quite easy to produce all that the poverty-stricken millions in the world need, if only people would not put profit-making before service, or mistake what they call " economic facts " for good economy.

THIS is no idle speculation ; for surely it is one of the things that really was demonstrated during the war, when four or five million men were turned into warriors, and I know not how many more were set to making munitions, and yet the nation as a whole was better off materially, perhaps, than it had ever been before, unless in some dark age back beyond the records of history.

THE war was a sufficient stimulus to set us (some of us) to work supporting one another—and supporting the war into the bargain—or rather, to induce the national taskmasters to pay people to work; for there is generally work where money is forthcoming to pay for it. But when the war was over we fell back into our usual inert, half-alive condition. We have not, as a community, in ordinary times, enough sense, will or energy to support ourselves decently, to provide a full living for all our members. We let things drift, and allow some to wallow in a surfeit of riches while others go short of necessities.

AND, while so many are in want there are at the same time, in the same country, thousands of idle people who would gladly work at supplying their wants, if only laws and what are called "economic facts" did not prevent them. Moreover, it is very largely the people who do some of the most indispensable work, when they are allowed to do it, who live in poverty, as well as insecurity. Any day one or other of them may slip into the ranks of the unemployed. Not much sympathy here; not much sanity!

THE other day a lecturer, speaking in Glasgow on a kindred subject, alluded to the miners' slogan in the late disastrous coal dispute, "not a penny off the wage, not a second on the day," as an instance of a formula which was expected to work magic irrespective of facts. I am not sure what magic effect was expected beyond heartening those who used it and impressing others with their determination. Doubtless such slogans are foolish, and are a poor substitute for hard thinking and reasoned persuasion. But surely the sad thing about that matter was that the whole nation did not recognise that, after all, in view of the findings of repeated government inquiries, this slogan represented something less than bare justice to the miners and that the whole nation did not insist on seeing justice done. And what shall we say of a nation that stood by and watched a million men and their families being starved into submission, a nation now apparently content to have their coal at the price of the poverty and depressed lives of those who hew and fetch it out of the earth? I know that many people are not so content. But, as a nation, we hold back; we cannot act. Where is our sympathy? Not much of it in evidence; nor much sanity!

PERHAPS, however, there is nothing very extraordinary in this; for ever since the beginning of history, and even before, mankind has been accustomed to the battening of one race, or people, or class on another. The result, in civilised lands, is what some people call "the class war." Others call it law and order, or even peace and goodwill, as long as no one ventures to complain. Nowadays there is some complaint, or "unrest," as it is called. Hence our industrial life is to a considerable extent a life of strife, of war.

TURN to politics. The object of political activity presumably is to maintain or bring about justice, peace and general welfare. But our politics also has this characteristic of strife, and consists largely of warring factions who try to persuade people that they (that is, their own party) are better and wiser than their opponents. So that there has come about an organised system of fault-finding and self-praise. What could be more demoralising, or less helpful? How can we hope to set our house in order by such means?

AS for religion—perhaps I need say no more than that here also we are divided. We seem to be far as yet from fulfilment of the prayer "that they all may be one."

SO, then, it appears that we live in a world of division and strife, with much injustice. The kingdom of this world is divided against itself.

MANY of us, perhaps most of us, see that there is something wrong. Every one in his senses who thinks of such things must recognise that. Yet we cannot move. Some sigh for a great man, or complain of agitators, and say they ought to be shot, or deported or locked up. Others become resigned and apathetic, cynical, or pessimistic. Others, again, may think they see a way out and work for it. But, as a people, as a community, we seem for the time being, to be helpless. I want to emphasise this point. Never mind if you disagree with my statement of conditions. You will agree that much needs to be put right. Indeed, nobody likes to see people unemployed, poverty-stricken, ragged, unkempt or miserable. The coalowners themselves protest that they would like to see the miners earning good wages. But the majority—especially those with influence—do not move. They have not the will, the imagination, the energy, the urgent incentive (such an incentive, for instance, as those in power would have if their own children or friends were directly in danger). The community as a whole is helpless.

AND I suspect that a helpless community is, in large proportion, made up of helpless individuals.

WHAT is the cause of all this? There are economic defects, political defects, religious defects, all of which are certainly in urgent need of attention. But I wish to-night to point out what seems to me to be an underlying defect, which perhaps receives less recognition, the removal of which might, I submit, lead to the removal of the others. I ask you, do not all this stupidity and inertia, all this strife and ill-will, arise out of the fact that man has not yet attained to understanding of himself, has not yet gained self-mastery?

IS not this twofold achievement—self-knowledge and self-mastery—the road, and the goal, both of individual and of social human development—of social progress?

AND now, at last, I come to Montessori; for it is here, I think, that Dr. Montessori can help us. It is obvious that the current education of the day is not calculated to lead either to self-knowledge or to self-mastery. The Montessori method opens the way towards both.

THE main Montessori criticisms, explicit or implicit, of current school methods are briefly, I imagine, somewhat as follows: (1) that they do not prepare a suitable environment for the child; (2) that they are not based on study of the child, but seek rather to impose adult notions on him and interfere with his natural activities and growth; (3) that intelligence is not nourished with reality and is deprived of its necessary activity. But the way to nourish intelligence and cultivate sane thought is to pay close attention to realities—to facts—and to let appropriate action follow. Dr. Montessori quotes Janet, who found that the one thing which differentiated insane from sane people was that insane people could not fix their attention intensely on external objects and note their particulars and characteristics with exactness.

Now, is it not possible that our apparent helplessness in face of great social evils, our constant failure to face facts, to test theories, to suit action to thought or to ideals—is it not more than likely that these sad defects of character result, at least partly, from these defects in our education, which, from early years, tend to divorce intelligence and thought from reality and from action, and thus tend to check the self-expression and growth of the soul.

THE people of the British Isles are on the whole, I suppose, a kindly and good-natured people. Yet every now and then they seem to tolerate with wonderful equanimity extraordinary outrages on the part of their representatives and agents, especially abroad. Often startling inhumanities are perpetrated by quite kindly people. These people are not expressing their better selves, just as the community is not expressing its better self through them. Could such things happen with a people whose members had been helped to grow in natural human grace, expressing their true selves and in the habit of suiting action to thought and knowledge? Surely neither individuals nor community know the real self within. Therefore they cannot express it. "Let us realise," says Dr. Brock, "that circumstances are downing us, not so much because they are bad in themselves, as because, from the deficiencies of our education, we have never learned to face them."[1]

MARK now in contrast some of the features and principles of the Montessori method.

THE child comes into a Montessori school probably in a state of internal disorder—much like many of us grown-ups, I fear. He

[1] HEALTH AND CONDUCT. p. 286.

finds a carefully prepared environment. He is taught exercises of practical life with care and precision—keeping himself clean, dusting, sweeping, waiting at table, &c.—also how to use various " didactic " or " development " material found by scientific experiment to meet the needs—nourish the inner life—of children at different stages of growth. These latter he may use or not use, as he likes. At first, probably, none of them will interest him much. Perhaps he will play with one or another for a few minutes more or less listlessly. Or he may interfere with the other children at their occupations ; or he may sit still, or loaf about, " doing nothing." But there comes a time when one of the " didactic " apparatus engages his interest. He becomes absorbed, concentrates his attention on working it correctly and, having achieved that, repeats the exercise again and again, until at last he leaves off, looking " rested, satisfied and uplifted." " This," says Dr. Montessori, " is the first phenomenon to be expected, as initiatory to those acts with which spiritual growth is bound up." It is truly a kind of conversion. The child becomes a new child. Probably he shows a new affection for his teacher and is friendly and considerate to the other children. He has attained to a measure of internal order. In time he gains the " work habit," and goes from strength to strength as his inner life is nourished by work with various objects. I am open to correction, but I think the chief noticeable results of this training are poise, happy activity, restfulness, affection and consideration for others, besides, of course, the knowledge and skill gained. The child has become a sociable being. And mark here a point for social progress. By this method children become sociable, not by being gathered in a group and *taught* to be sociable, but by being helped to be themselves. In other words, look after the individual, and society, the social spirit, will look after itself. Man is by nature sociable.

AND what of the teacher, or directress ? Her rôle is to observe, to watch, to be ready to help, but only when the child needs her help, lest she interfere with his physico-psychological processes. She teaches what she has to teach—exercises of practical life and the use of didactic material—with precision, and with economy of words, lest she confuse him with superfluous talk. The " offering " of this material is an art which requires training, experience and tact, to seize opportunities, to withdraw gracefully if the child does not " accept," so that he shall not feel that he has refused anything, and, if he " accepts," to teach him properly—in general, to be helpful without intervening between the child and the satisfaction of his inner need.

FOR what does the teacher watch ? She watches for movements of the spirit within the child—what Dr. Montessori calls " the inner life "—seeking to evolve and express itself in each child entrusted to

her care. It is her task and her privilege to prepare a way and a welcome for the spirit in the child. That spirit is holy and righteous, and will do well if rightly ministered to and not thwarted. If thwarted, the same spirit—or something to which it gives way—will wreak a terrible vengeance. Perhaps this is what the theologians call the wrath of God. It is a dreadful thing. I see it daily in uncouth youths, or poor, dirty, ill-clad children, in ignorant and disorderly parents, and not least, I fear, in the disorder within myself.

THE Montessori method may, then, be called essentially a spiritual method. And for that very reason it respects and jealously guards the relation and the reactions between the inner life of the child and the material objects in his environment. The soul of the child looks out on the world and uses his senses to feel, to weigh, to hear, to see. It is, therefore, tremendously important that each sense, and the impulse behind it, should find the right material stimulus at the right time. At the time for clutching there must be something at hand to clutch. At the time for feeling let there be different surfaces at hand to feel. So may the soul be nourished progressively through the senses and through the intelligence, by contact with material things—with what, in this connection, Dr. Montessori calls " reality."

HERE is a principle which applies throughout all education—that is, throughout life. For the child it requires a suitable environment furnished with the stimuli needed for his growth. He must be allowed to react naturally to these stimuli ; that is, in his own way. " If each object has its own place," says Dr. Montessori in one of her lectures, " it is interesting for the child to put them back, to wash and dry them carefully. The table being white invites the child to remove any spots of jam, &c. It is not necessary to draw his attention. *If we tell him we go ahead of his spontaneous activity.* A child of 3½ has plenty of time to learn. It is more important to see what he will do of his own accord than to correct him." I should like to have that written up in letters of gold or of fire in every school and in every home where there are children. Well, no ; perhaps it would be better that the children should not see it. It might spoil their spontaneity. It would be better to have it engraven in the minds of the parents and teachers.

EXPRESSION is important ; but, to be fruitful, to promote healthy growth it must be self-expression ; that is, it must come from within ; it must not be dictated by another. If this self-expression does not appear as and when expected the educator must be patient. Until this spontaneous responsive action does take place the cycle is not complete, the harvest will not be gathered ; but a hurried or dictated response prevents spontaneous activity, breaks the cycle, so to speak, and arrests soul-growth.

THUS the child must have what he needs. He must deal with it as his inner need dictates, not as someone else dictates. The child is not only receptive, as we seem all this time to have thought (at least we have acted as if we thought that was, or ought to be, the chief characteristic of a pupil); he is also reactive. And to grow healthily he must react for himself. No one else can do it for him, or even tell him how.

THEREFORE let us beware of checking spontaneous activity—the child's healthy reaction to any experience, any discovery, any knowledge he has gained. It may be through such early checking of our own activity that we have acquired the habit of being content with thought and theory—quasi-thought and still-born theory—without appropriate activity—to our undoing. Dr. Montessori illustrates this in a striking way, in criticism, particularly, of our British, or "Anglo-Saxon," cult of athletics. It is as though, she says, we had cut off its motor mechanism from our nervous system and attached it to the vegetative system, thus sterilising the brain and overtaxing the heart. Is that not just what we do seem to do? Is not that, perhaps, one reason why we are so helpless?

IT is a common complaint that we separate our religious and business lives. The difference between Sunday sentiment and profession and weekday practice is a favourite subject of satire. But do not such contrasts and inconsistencies pervade our life in general? We condemn idleness and talk of the dignity of labour; but the hewing of wood and the drawing of water—the humbler tasks of life—are relegated to those who must needs sell their strength for money—the great thing being to get money enough to pay others to do such things for us. Thus brain and muscle are unnaturally separated, in the individual as well as in the community. We do not know ourselves and we are to one another strangers and oppressors. But Dr. Montessori really does recognise and foster the "dignity of labour," and makes a strong point of practical activities. Almost her first care in training the child is to teach him how to do things for himself, thus building up his "independence," by which she means his ability to do for himself things which so many people depend on others to do for them.

"THE task of the Montessori school," says Mrs. Radice,[3] "is to slow the child down, not to drive it—to give it easy steps to climb instead of steep ones; peace and leisure for climbing them in the place of hurry and rush. It is also to give the child 'heaps to do.'"

YES, heaps to do; for, as she quotes from Dr. Montessori, "the child, without occupation, is starved," and "the child ought not to be made

[3] THE NEW CHILDREN. p. 127.

to work, but it ought not to be shut out from helping if it wants to help."[4] "The whole of the Montessori method," she says again, "is permeated with the sense of the joy of work, and also with the sense of the value of leisure." It is through such work and leisure that the inner life finds expression. Mr. Sandeman says, in the article from which I have already quoted, "it is only by expression that we get hold of truth; unless boy or man be expressing all the time, with all his being, what he knows and believes and feels, he makes no step further in knowledge or power. Expression is the expiration necessary to inspiration; it is freedom, satisfaction, and the very life of the spirit."

DR. MONTESSORI has made a valuable contribution to the study of freedom. Her discoveries seem to reveal two aspects: firstly, freedom of method. The child, as stated, is free to move about and to choose, or not choose, amongst the objects provided in an environment prepared to suit his needs and to work "in accordance with the natural wants of the inner life."[5] Liberty is bestowed on him, "that is to say, that his calm and peaceful expansion should not be disturbed by the intervention of an untimely and disturbing influence; just as the body of the new-born infant should be left in peace to assimilate its nourishment and grow properly."[6] Secondly, the freedom of achievement, when the individual has achieved internal order and control of his powers.

MAY we not with confidence assume that a community whose members have achieved this internal order and self-control will itself, by reason thereof, possess social order and freedom? And there appears to be no reason why all normal people should not attain to this stature if educated on these lines. Is this too much to claim? I think not, though I realise, and I want you all to realise, what a tremendous claim it is. That is the chief object of this paper.

ANOTHER principle I read in the Montessori method is that the best preparation for future stages of growth, future periods of life, is to deal appropriately and adequately with the present stage. Therefore each child is studied to learn his present need at each moment, and to meet it. As the child is father of the man, so to-day is father of to-morrow. This principle, I fancy, would make some difference if applied all round.

"SERVE the inner need"—that is the watchword. Consider a moment. Suppose we were to try this plan with delinquents and criminals. Suppose we studied their needs in a scientific and human way, and tried to provide for them in a scientific and human way. Do you

[4] Ibid., p. 128.
[5] THE ADVANCED METHOD. Vol. I., p. 109.
[6] Ibid., Vol. I., p. 71.

not think that they would be more likely to grow into useful citizens than they are while we just punish them without troubling about their inner needs?

SUPPOSE we all took to dealing with one another like this, and, instead of getting angry with those with whom we clash in one way or another, or who resist our efforts to induce them to conform to our views, suppose we always looked for, and tried to serve, some "inner need" struggling for expression even in the most outrageous conduct or utterance. Do you not think that that would change the face of the world to our heart's desire rather more quickly, rather more safely and securely, than will the constant wrangling of what is called politics, the strife and competition and profit-hunting of industrialism, or the discord in much of what is called religion to-day.

So it seems that Montessori principles and methods are revolutionary, in the sense that, if faithfully observed, they will bring about what in our Bible is called "repentance." But the Greek word, *metanoia*, of course, means a revolutionary change in attitude of mind.

I DO not claim that none of the good points of Montessorianism have ever been heard of before in the world. Perhaps all of them have—at one time or another. Indeed its fundamental principle and faith are as old as Christianity, or older. I believe, moreover, that there are at the present time other workers in education, psychology, sociology, philosophy (I will not venture to name any for fear of omissions), who, in days to come, may be counted worthy co-operators in the same field. But I do claim that Dr. Montessori has made discoveries, enunciated principles, and worked out a method which, if intelligently accepted and faithfully applied, will meet much of the need, both in education and in social life, of this day and generation. She is not alone in advocating self-expression and freedom in education; but she has invented a technique for securing them founded on scientific research. Moreover, the Montessori method is itself a method of continuous scientific research.

I FEAR I have dealt with controversial matters this evening in a rather dogmatic way, looking at them through my own dim and coloured spectacles. Perhaps I may be forgiven, for to me it all seems dreadfully urgent; and I could only tell you what I myself seem to see, as I seem to see it. I have spoken out of the agony of my soul; for daily I see children—such dear children—who are, or might be, all glorious within, stunted by ill-usage, cabined, cribbed, confined by circumstance, souls unfree in children of unfree parents, only partly alive—and my heart cries out "How long?"

I WILL try to sum up. Our so-called economics, our so-called politics, much of what we call religion, and even our education—all seem to

conspire to produce stunted beings, not wholly alive, not wholly human, who cannot live or act according to their true nature, because that nature is mortified and hidden from them. They mistake for human nature the arrested and distorted characters thus fashioned. And, where they have energy enough to run at all, they mostly run after false pleasures and foolish ambitions, and quarrel over them. In the resulting scramble inevitably the majority fare badly, and, if we are to believe Ruskin, the devil takes the foremost. But here is a method by which the inner life, the true self, is studied scientifically and helped to express itself and grow according to its own nature. The children's feet are set on the path of self-knowledge, and their souls are nourished with the bread of life, that is with truth—truth in little things leading to truth in great things—and care is taken that their steps shall not be hindered on the way.

WELL, I have made but a small beginning of this great theme—taken, as it were, a first bite. But I hope that I have said enough to show that the message of Montessori is a call to repentance, to a reversal of our attitude towards the problems of life and growth. It calls on us to cease from imposing our own notions upon the child, or, indeed, upon any one; and it shows us how reverently to watch and wait, if so be that, by serving the Spirit, we might help to prepare the way of the New Man and make his paths straight.

ARTHUR ST. JOHN.

PROFESSIONAL WORKERS AND ORGANISATION.

EARLY societies are very static and do not readily change and develop into what we have come to regard as civilised societies. The periods of savagery and of both the lower and the upper barbarism occupied enormous stretches of time compared with the period which we may count as that of civilisation. The 10,000 years of an Egyptian or a Chinese civilisation are little more than hours in the week of barbaric society. As to the reasons of this differential rate of progressive movement, little serious research appears to have been done. But we may note certain points. For instance, the basic inventions of savage and barbaric life, although all important for later development, made the simple life of early man more endurable perhaps, or gave those who were fortunate an advantage over other men and the lower animals. Yet they were not on the whole, and could not be, inventions which differentiated classes of men inside a single society. They were inventions which could not be patented and withheld by individuals or groups and so made capable of exploitation, limited, yet perhaps intensified.

WHERE differentiation, say in manufacture or production, becomes pronounced, there is a tendency to form vocational castes. Class distinctions indeed are very distinguishing marks of civilised life, particularly when money comes into use and also the written word. The introduction of coinage led to the establishment of a class, with the vocation of attending to financial business, a class which ultimately found it more profitable to do so than to engage in actual productive work of any kind. Theories of interest were formulated and applied to usury. Sooner or later the attitude was bound to be applied to all business, when there arose the great conceptions of a separate class of men living on interest and profits, whilst other men laboured for a master and not for themselves, and were content to be in receipt of a wage payment, which was a fractional part of their production.

THE cleavage between vocational groups became more acute than ever, with the great revolution in industrial processes, consequent upon the machine inventions, which are associated with the names of Arkwright, Sievwright, Hargreaves, Watt, Bolton, Newcomen and many others. The whole civilised and even perhaps to a great extent, the uncivilised world, felt the shock effect of those inventions, and the whole social life of vast communities was revolutionised. Savage and barbaric peoples had their lands ravaged for raw materials to feed the insatiable new machines and the new industry and commerce which was growing up in the North Sea, partly unnoticed in the clouds of revolutionary war in Europe.

It is not, however, with this aspect of the revolution we wish to deal here, but with its effect on the inhabitants of England and the vocational groups it accentuated and created, as well as with the theory of society which social philosophers elaborated, in an attempt at analysis or justification for the social and economic arrangements prevailing in the new hideous factory towns.

The system on the productive side has been called the factory system, on the financial side the capitalist system, and on the social side the wage system. There were factories, capitalists and wages long before 1760, but nevertheless those terms do in the main, describe the principal characteristics of the rising economy, whereby England became the workshop of the world. Men, women and children were regimented into mills and factories, set monotonous tasks and compelled to labour for a master's profit long fixed hours. The enclosures, whose evil effects were yet to be consummated in the great General Enclosure Act, had rendered almost the whole working class landless and ready instruments in the development of the new wage system. With loss of land and attachment to the soil, they lost the great incentive to fruitful labour and the habits of independence. The new capitalism took on a more sinister complexion, and it has left a legacy of tragic circumstance, beyond which the vision of most people cannot yet pierce.

The erstwhile independent yeoman, deprived of small holding and common rights, drifted from his native village and countryside to the new factory towns and was taken on as one of many hands. He was under the bitter necessity of contracting with an employer to use his labour power as the latter thought fit, his return being a money wage, apparently high in terms of village prices, but woefully inadequate to maintain his old standard of life. Wages were depressed to a point now admitted to be below the subsistence level, until they were actually subsidised from the rates after the Speenhamland decision. The owners of the ugly factories, which polluted well-nigh every fair stream in the country, were able to dictate harsh terms to their workers, to deprive them of their ancient social and political liberties, and to deny their children education because they were the possessors of a great monopoly in the new machines and in trading facilities generally, having only to exert themselves indeed to grasp political power from the ancient landed interest.

The new inventions were responsible for a phenomenal growth in material prosperity on the part of those who were not responsible to society as a whole, a growth quite disproportionate to the development of the idea of public welfare. The ancient social morality had been sapped during several hundred years, and collapsed quickly under the

strain of capitalist society. Morality and religion as well as business became matters of individual interest only and as such declined from their ancient status. To parallel the development of the crude town society of a hundred years ago and the relevant indifference to moral and æsthetic concern, we have to go to some of the mushroom towns which are still growing up in the Middle West of America. The shock in England was great enough to depress the physical stamina of the people, as well as to modify the whole intellectual environment.

THE latter modification made it easy for succeeding generations to give intellectual and spiritual assent to the doctrines justifying usury, and it was laid down as axiomatic that capital must have its dividend, even if a vast population should live in misery. The old assizes for fixing the quality of goods had ceased to exist for many years, and the very tradition of the eight-hours day and the ban the gilds once put on overtime was forgotten. *Laissez-faire* was not only a doctrine concerning trade, but was one which was applied through the whole social and political body. Competition raged between traders for the supply of commodities. It also raged amongst wage earners for the sale of what was also regarded as a commodity, their labour power. Parents competed amongst themselves for jobs, by sending their women and young children into the factories to perform the less skilled operations. In the preaching of free trade and unrestricted competition, the old concern for apprenticeship, craftsmanship, trade regulation and fixed prices vanished, and there remained the cash nexus and the pseudo-sanctity of dividends.

THE wage system and its necessary corollory, a permanent margin of unemployed persons, spread destitution and privation throughout the land. The tyrannies of the newly enriched factory owners can scarcely be imagined. The margin of unemployed labour was used ruthlessly to cut the wages of those employed, and no longer did the worker possess his small holding as his basic support, so that when not employed by the factory owner he had to face starvation. The operations he could perform in the new machine economy were limited, with the consequence that he was no longer a craftsman, but a hand, in the great sub-division of processes. As a worker he underwent a process of differentiation, and it is this differentiation which has put the workers into so many vocational classes with their snobbish sub-divisions, effectually preventing unity for the achievement of emancipation. Where these castes exist, culture is difficult of achievement, for their existence is inimical to that higher Common Mind, which is the basis of a national or European culture. The town labourer despises his agricultural brother; we have the quarrel of unskilled and semi-skilled and the contempt of the skilled labourer for both. Between the manual worker also, and the non-manual staff worker,

a great gulf is fixed, and an even wider one between the latter and awe-inspiring management. Law, medicine and the church maintain the privilege of " professions," with the press a doubtful fourth in this favoured class, whilst grocers, drapers and clerks make up a vast extra-professional field—but each riding his own mount, in his own way.

THE existence of these incipient castes (for such they are) makes society extremely unstable, and each newly emergent factor in the situation adds to instability. This is to be seen in the movement amongst certain classes of professional or semi-professional workers towards a third party position in industry, a key position of dominance and control over manual workers and over employers and shareholders. This has become possible by a wrong interpretation of the functional principle, and by the fact that the processes of management and staff work have become so sub-divided that the owners of the larger undertakings have to leave control in the hands of paid managers and technicians. Staff work tends to absorb an ever-increasing share of the man-power available for management, perhaps with advantage in some respects. The revolution is still in process, and it is important to understand the organisation and ideals of the staff worker, for although in every case organising ostensibly for protective purposes, the method of organisation, whether with a view to the creation of a strong middle position between manual worker and employers, or because of a feeling of solidarity with other workers, will make a great difference in the new social economy.

ORGANISATION in protective societies arose naturally amongst the manual workers, particularly those herded together in large numbers, in mills, factories and engineering shops. Indeed, protective organisation could not have taken place to any great extent amongst the non-manual workers, because staff work was very little developed in the early days of the industrial revolution, and even in engineering the highly complex duties of the modern draughtsman and designer were still performed by the man who made the engine. During the bitter struggle which the manual workers waged for the effective right to combine, we know little of any activity of a similar nature amongst the non-manual workers. The repeal of the Combination Laws in 1824 only gave a nominal right to organise, sufficient, however, to afford an impetus to the general movement. Organised employers were slow to recognise the right of the unions to speak on behalf of their workpeople. It is only, for instance, within the last dozen years or so that the railway companies recognised such a powerful body as that possessed by the railwaymen. The recognition of manual workers is now fairly complete, and has made the task of organisation much easier for the non-manual workers.

FROM about 1890 the movement for the organisation of various sections of the non-manual, or as they are coming to be called, the professional workers, has become very pronounced. The earliest classes to organise were shop assistants and railway clerks, both classes which to a considerable extent could scarcely be regarded as staff, or have any professional bias. The National Union of Clerks was also brought into being, but despite its priority in time, it has not shown any remarkable results, possibly because of intrinsic difficulties of organisation through its activities cutting necessarily into almost every industry, and because of the low estimation in which clerkly functions are held by artisan, technician, and indeed by those who perform clerkly functions in banks, insurance offices and on the stock exchange.

EVEN in the unions which were organised before the last century closed, the progress of enrolment was slow, but became greatly accelerated among railway clerks, shop assistants and post-office workers in the dozen years before the war and also since 1914. Not only had some staff workers, like the shipbuilding and engineering draughtsmen, begun the task of organisation before the war broke out, but the number of sporadic and frequently abortive attempts elsewhere would show that whilst the war made the opportunity for many, the conditions were already ripe, and a spirit of unrest common throughout the whole body.

THE condition of war-time favoured the growth of the demand for workshop control, and the discussions revolving round the idea were bound to have their effect on public opinion, especially that part of it represented by staff workers in close contact with the munition factories and engineering works. Not only was it in engineering centres that the largest demands for control and better conditions were made, but it was in them also that the organisation of the non-manual workers in protective trade unions became most pronounced.

THE conditions prevailing in the great engineering, shipbuilding and munition industries, whereby the workers in the shops succeeded to a considerable extent in vastly improving their position, still left the non-manual workers in those industries at the mercy of circumstance. A strong feeling of resentment against being left out of bonus awards was engendered among staff workers, and the result was a definite move towards organisation on their part, scarcely as yet a conscious Trade Union movement. Some of those war-time unions have no doubt had a hard struggle to live in the era of uneasy peace since 1918, and a few of them have disappeared altogether. Most of those in existence now, however, look like becoming permanent and strong institutions. The various sections of technical men on the staffs are notable examples, whether it be associations of power engineers,

supervisory unions, or those catering for draughtsmen and others. Some of them possess a most advanced trade union structure and outlook; others follow a third party or professional institute policy, but behind each is the economic urge, and a certain recognition that the near future will see a great struggle in the control of the establishments. They realise that only union will enable them, the workers at present most intimately concerned, to have a sufficiently safeguarded position when the time arrives.

THE importance of the mass movements amongst non-manual workers can only be understood, if we endeavour to realise the important functions which this class of men fulfil in modern industry. The old working masters, who knew the details of their industry from A to Z, have practically ceased to exist, their place as owners being taken by the joint stock company, and as managers by salaried administrators. The growth in the size of industrial undertakings, and the extended application of the joint stock principle, introduced a mass of shareholders, who, even under a less complex system of industry than prevails to-day, would have been ignorant of detail. Under the complicated and specialised system of the heavy machine industry their position is of no functional importance whatever, the consequence being that those with money to invest are driven to depend upon a class of professional managers and administrators for safeguarding their interests and looking after the efficiency of industry as a whole and in detail. Thus their office tends to degenerate into that of drawing a maximum amount of profit as dividends and directors' fees.

AN endeavour was made for quite a long time by the exponents of the old system of private industry, to keep staff and administrative workers separate from the workers in the shops. It was impressed upon the former that their material interests lay in the same direction as those of their employers, and not in that of the operatives, and that consequently, they should avoid contact with the latter's trade union organisations. For a considerable time this policy was successful, and is even maintained successfully to-day amongst the upper managerial class, members of which are constantly entering into the employers' class, and securing a share in the profits of the business. Sometimes other methods are used. Organisation amongst bank clerks, for instance, has been hampered by the existence of internal guilds, which almost correspond to Whitley machinery elsewhere.

THE growth in the spirit of professional unionism has a close connection with the growth in the size of staffs, which has been phenomenal in the last forty or fifty years, particularly on the marketing side, and in industries like engineering, where good staff work saves thousands of pounds. Greater attention is paid to detail, and staff work has become of paramount importance, those engaged in it having increased

at a prodigious rate relatively to the mass of the general workers. Even small repair shops now generally keep one or more draughtsmen, although some employers look upon them as unremunerative luxuries. Where even manufacturing engineers fifty years ago had the smallest of drawing office staffs, these only indicating the general nature of the operations, to-day these are detailed to the last little bolt and nut.

A RECENT British Trades Union Congress saw the quiet register of a bond of union between the manual workers and the non-manual workers, which is of significance. Quite a number of non-manual workers' unions have been affiliated to Congress for a number of years, but there has prevailed a general atmosphere of half suspicious toleration rather than one of comradeship on the part of the manual workers to the non-manual workers. Meantime some of the most progressive unions catering for the staff side of industry and the civil service, had formed themselves into a National Federation of Professional Workers to further the organisation of all engaged in technical, administrative and supervisory occupations. It is interesting to note that this Federation, at the moment of writing, has affiliated to it, unions aggregating about half a million members, about half of the unions being also in the Trades Union Congress. Recognising that it was desirable that there should be no overlapping or spirit of competition between Congress and the Federation, and to help on the general work of organising non-manual workers, the General Council of Congress opened negotiations for the formation of a standing joint committee of its own General Council and the Federation. These negotiations were ratified by both parties and the Joint Consultative Committee set up. Naturally the committee is proceeding very cautiously, but it will be interesting to see what fruit it bears.

THE significance of Congress recognition of this organisation of non-manual workers is considerable, for the men and women in the staff grades for which it caters are now definitely brought into close contact with, and included in, the general Labour Movement. The effectiveness of the aid which each class of worker can give to the other will be measured largely by the work of the Joint Committee, but more important than that will be the evidence it may afford of the solidarity of all labour.

AT a time when industrial amalgamations and trade union alliances are much talked of, and in certain cases achieved, it is of interest to know that the Professional Workers' Federation has actually grouped the unions affiliated to it in industrial groups, so that there may be an intimate discussion of problems common to several unions catering for different classes of staff workers in one industry. One instance of such a group is an Engineering Alliance between foremen, draughtsmen and clerks in the engineering industry, an alliance which meets

regularly to discuss matters of common interest, and which those at the head of affairs hope to convert into a body with executive power, able to exert considerable pressure on behalf of the staff workers in the engineering industry. It is possible that such an alliance may facilitate the achievement of control of industry by the whole body of workers in their own industry. The Federation similarly has clerical and transport groups.

STAFF workers occupy an extremely strong position in many cases, but the very numbers of employees which have become necessary for efficient staffing, have induced employers to treat them to a considerable extent as they do the manual workers in the shops, at least so far as wages, hours, &c., are concerned. Employers have, moreover, attempted to withhold recognition of these unions as negotiating bodies on behalf of their members. In this endeavour they have been to some extent successful, as this class of worker is readily tempted to imagine that he occupies a third or middle place in industry, holding the balance evenly between management and the manual worker. The most advanced of the Unions believe that their cause is the general Labour cause, and that the middle position in industry must ultimately prove untenable. They feel that the non-manual worker must either align himself directly and without equivocation with the employer or with the general mass of the workers. Some of the unions are moving to professionalism in its most undesirable connotation, but these unions are the exception rather than the rule. On the decision of the staff unions may depend to a large extent the future orientation of industry. Most of the new non-manual workers' unions show a decided tendency to align themselves with the manual workers by affiliation to the British Trades Union Congress, and no doubt the leaders of the Trade Union Movement will do everything possible by sympathy and help, to facilitate and hasten this alignment. In a number of cases the employers' federated organisations have granted them the fullest recognition.

THOSE unions which have shown a tendency to hold aloof from the bulk of the Labour world stand in the way of industrial control by the workers as advocated by national guildsmen and others in England since about 1910. Some of them are encouraged to pursue a semi-union policy without assisting in the general work of trade unionism, because of the key position in their own industry, where they have sometimes been able to achieve results out of all proportion to their power and efforts. Such a policy may well induce reactions upon those who pursue it nevertheless, reactions which may sweep them out of existence altogether.

THERE has also entered into consideration the more snobbish aspects of function and status. The professional spirit is one to be aimed at in every department of industry, for in simple language, it means a

substitution of the spirit of service for that of exploitation, the functional idea for the wage basis, and an honourable status for a status dependent upon competition in the labour market. The monopoly of any department of labour power carries with it duties to the community and to other classes of workers as well as rights to the monopolisers.

THE progress of one such association which came under the author's observation is interesting. By its possession of the monopoly and control in a certain public utility it was able by what was purely the method of the strike to achieve some results for its members. A succession of these gave it a feeling of independence and strength which effectually prevented closer contact with other unions in the Labour Movement, upon some sections of which, indeed, it has been accused of poaching. It has definitely taken up a third party attitude in industry, although not actually in the managerial or indeed in truly administrative work at all. It seems to be actually moving away at the moment from its semi-union position, having demonstrated its ability to use the power of monopoly it possesses, towards the idea of becoming a profession in the narrow sense, and thus making its present organisation something resembling those incorporated technical institutions, which have no strictly industrial functions.

THERE are also bodies catering for the higher administrative bodies of managers, &c., but so far those organisations have as yet the most nebulous of policies, and it is exceedingly difficult to make even the most sketchy outline of their future development.

ONE other interesting development of recent years, has been the growth of organisations for independent individual workers, such as those often engaged in the applied arts. Latterly many of those have formed a British Confederation of Arts, which in turn is affiliated to the Confederation des Travailleurs Intellectuals, and has some rather loose connection with the Federation of Professional Workers in this country. The future of these bodies is still uncertain, both in this country and abroad, and it is unlikely they will develop anything like a trade union or Labour outlook generally.

THE main development, however, of staff workers, technicians, administrators, supervisors, bank men, scientific and educational workers, not forgetting the vast body of workers in the civil service, is towards a trade union structure as at present understood. They bring a new attitude of mind, the professional mind, and a new possibility of control, within reach of the workers' movement.

MOST of the older trade unions have grown up in the mentality of the middle of last century. They have with difficulty thrown off belief in the melioristic doctrines of the radicals, and have adopted on the

whole the ideology of collectivism as enunciated by the Fabian Society in the eighties and nineties of last century. This ideology has become fixed because of the successful work of many municipal undertakings, and by the establishment of the political Labour Party.

THE newer unions of the non-manual workers have come to birth in a different environment. The circumstances of the war had brought the claims for self-government in industry amongst the more advanced unionists to a head. Moreover, the chief weapon of the collectivists, that of parliamentary representation, had been somewhat heavily discounted since about 1910. The political stage fright of 1906 was no longer operative. A philosophic and intellectual revolt was in process against the mechanisation of ideas, and it spread to the world of industry and found its intellectual exposition in England in the doctrines of guild socialism.

WHAT seemed to demand a radical break in the policy already determined by the politically minded unions, was like new wine to the new unions, who indeed would have difficulty in getting their members to agree to take part in political activity. Knowing that they formed the mainstay of the administrative side of industry, and seemingly encouraged by the governmental schemes of Whitley Councils, many of them have the idea of securing industrial control lodged firmly in the brains of their most advanced members. They have been appealed to in a place where they are peculiarly susceptible, and their weight may possibly determine the issue of the future struggle. But the question of the future is more likely to be that of the detailed and practical control of industry, rather than the vague and nebulous achievement of representative political democracy by the use of trade union funds.

IF the foregoing analysis be correct, and if industrial democracy is to be established without anything in the nature of a violent social upheaval, it will be because both professional and manual workers have realised their community of interest and ideals, having forsaken the shibboleths of utopia-exploiters and got down to the job in hand. In this sense an understanding of the organisation of professional workers is a thing of interest and importance to the social student of to-day.

G. W. THOMPSON.

THE RISE OF THE DANISH PEASANTRY.*

III. Co-operation in Denmark.

One of Denmark's greatest historians once said that Denmark, as a little people, frequently had to learn from the great peoples and obtain new and useful ideas from them, but the Danes had a capacity for clothing ideas in native attire, and appropriating them, not as slavish imitators, but as independent men. This is quite true of co-operative ideas. Denmark imported them from England, and even now the principles of the Rochdale Pioneers provide the foundation for Danish co-operative associations; but in the application of these ideas, in the adaptation of them to ever new spheres of activity, Denmark cannot but see its own contribution to the history of co-operation.

About twenty years after the beginning in Rochdale, a clergyman, Reverend Sonne, formed a "Workers' Society" in the little town of Thisted, on the west coast of Jutland, and this event is regarded by Danish co-operators as the beginning of the movement in their country. The movement at present, however, retains little of its original form and characteristics: starting in the market towns the movement shifted to the country, and farmers and small-holders became the members of the associations. But during the last twenty years the field of co-operative activity has been greatly extended.

Attention will first be directed to Denmark's co-operative stores, although the outstanding feature of co-operation in Denmark is the exceptionally well-developed associations of producers and exporters; but the growth and extension of the stores indicate typical features of the whole movement.

Co-operation in Denmark is a rural movement. Until the beginning of this century it was, literally speaking, only the rural population who were members of the associations; but from that time people of the towns also joined. The centre of gravity of the movement, however, remains in the country. Of the rural population the farming element constitutes the majority.

The tardiness of the town workers in joining the co-operative associations is partly due to the fact that the Danish Labour Movement was greatly influenced by the German socialists, whose lack of confidence in co-operative ideas they shared. At the beginning of the new century, however, there was evidence that a new point of view was being adopted both in Germany and Denmark.

*Articles I. and II. of this series appeared in the January and April issues of the Review.

SEVERAL circumstances must be considered before it can be understood why Danish co-operation became a farmers' movement and, in this respect, different from the movement in other countries. No doubt, conditions of a purely practical nature were partly responsible for this course of development. In 1857, the influence of liberal doctrines led to the abolition of handicraft trades and business in the towns, and free and equal opportunities of starting industrial enterprises were secured. But a certain restriction survived until 1919. This was to the effect that outside the market towns, within a radius of five or six miles of them, no private wholesale or retail business was to be conducted. The only way of starting a business within these protected areas was the co-operative store, which was not subject to the restriction.

ANOTHER factor is to be found in the political conditions that have obtained during the last half century. The country population, to a great extent, belonged to the liberal party, and the town population to the conservative. When, after 1880, the difference between the parties deepened, especially as a result of the unparliamentary handling of finances by the Conservative Government, the economic fight was transferred to the economic domain of the combatants. Until this time the farmers had respected the freedom, in respect of political matters, of the merchants with whom they dealt; but, after 1885, it appeared to them that the towns supported a government which flouted the laws of the Constitution, and that such an attitude warranted a discontinuance of business relations. The membership of the co-operative stores then rose considerably, and the number of new societies increased from year to year. It is evident that co-operation must find favourable conditions of growth in a people who steadily fought to realise the ideal of equality; the fight for political equality and freedom created in the Danish rural population a feeling of solidarity which, in economic life, found an almost ideal expression in the work of co-operation.

THIS feeling of solidarity, however, did not arise solely from common political convictions; equal and uniform conditions gave rise to a natural fellowship, and common tasks were readily undertaken by all. But bearing all other factors in mind, general opinion in Denmark favours the view that the most important reason for the triumph of co-operative ideas among the peasants is to be found, not in the social and political spheres, but in that of the spiritual influences which emanate from the Danish folk high-schools.

THE writer of the history of Danish co-operation, H. Hertel, who had no direct personal connection with the high-schools, writes: "These schools awakened in young men and women a yearning for knowledge and a desire to work; the character of the pupils was strengthened,

and they left the schools with a much enlarged outlook on life. To satisfy its yearning for knowledge a current of youth flowed from the folk high-schools to the agricultural schools, and when it afterwards passed out into life it did so with a strong feeling of fellowship, and a desire to work for common progress. Youth thus gained some of the qualifications necessary to the success of a co-operative movement."

In a sketch of the Danish Co-operative Movement, Director Anders Nielsen, a leading figure in the movement, writes of the high-school: "It has filled in and levelled the clefts in society, and thereby paved the way for working together. It has sent students out into life with an added love for the country and its achievements, riper and more thoughtful, more receptive to life's teachings, and therefore well equipped to understand and make their way where the less developed run aground. This significance of the folk high-schools has now been emphasised and affirmed so often, and from so many sides, that it can well be stated as a fact that not only the co-operative movement, but the cultural position of the Danish farmers on the whole, rests on this foundation, and when we thus consider the social importance of the co-operative movement, and its economic contribution which has led to the present position and development, we must acknowledge with gratitude the great religious and school leaders, Grundtvig and Kold, and their many co-workers and followers who have called forth a higher culture and feeling of solidarity among the people, and who taught the people to think and use their powers so as to develop their lives in such a way that the united efforts of all, not only the individual but the whole community, is benefited."

It must be noted, however, that the high-schools have never undertaken direct propaganda for co-operative ideas: only during recent years has the subject received consideration as a part of sociological study.

In 1896 there was established a co-operative wholesale society through which the Danish co-operative stores become more and more their own merchants, importers and manufacturers; but whilst Denmark is the most co-operative country in Europe this condition is not due solely to the development of co-operative stores. It is due also to the application of co-operative ideas and principles in other spheres.

First, in 1882, came co-operation in the dairying industry. The original rules, which were to become the pattern for numerous co-operative dairies, embodied: common risks for the members combined with joint responsibility; the division of trading surpluses of profit according to the amount of capital held; and free admission to membership. At this time the country was passing through the economic crisis, and the dairy industry offered to Danish agriculture possibilities

which the older methods of using the soil did not admit. Then it was that co-operative ideas helped the peasants to a state of freedom from dependence on outside capital, and enabled them, without support from the state, to carry through what was little less than a revolution in Danish agriculture.

THE fact that the peasants themselves established the dairies—as well as other co-operative productive agencies—enabled the small farmers to obtain the advantages of large scale farming—division of labour, economic use of machinery, large purchases of raw materials, and collective selling of standardised products. In this way the produce of the small farms came to compete on more than favourable terms with that of the large manor farms ; indeed, the quality of the products from the co-operative dairies came to excel.

THE characteristic feature of the Danish co-operative dairies is, however, not only their first-class produce, but also the fact that they hold such an important place in Danish agriculture. Much the greater part of Danish agriculture is linked directly or indirectly with the dairies, and the milk of 86.2 per cent. of all the cows in the country was handled by the dairies.

THE conditions which have favoured the growth of co-operative dairies are essentially the same as those mentioned with respect to the co-operative stores. The high-school played a very prominent part, as was revealed by investigations made in the nineties, by the famous Danish physicist, Paul la Cour. He endeavoured to find out how many high-school students there were among the chairmen and managers of the co-operative dairies. The enquiry showed that 47 per cent. of the managers of the dairies had attended a high-school, 24 per cent. had attended an agricultural school, and 62 per cent. a dairy school. From these figures it will be seen that some of them had attended more than one of the schools, and only 10 per cent. had not attended any of the schools. The number, 90 per cent., is so overwhelming that one cannot resist the assertion that it is the people from these schools who have secured the chief places in the dairies.

IT is still more important to notice how many former high-school students there are among the chairmen of the co-operative dairy associations ; i.e., among peasants who have been selected by their fellows to fill positions of responsibility. A rough examination shows that of all the chairmen, 54 per cent. have been at a high-school, 23 per cent. at an agricultural school, and 2 per cent. at a dairy school. These figures show clearly and distinctly that the high-school students have been the pioneers of the co-operative movement in the country districts, and that the high-schools have supplied the movement with its local leaders.

In one sphere after another of Danish agriculture co-operative ideas have victoriously won their way. A Danish farm is now connected with a net-work of co-operative organisations. The numerous threads by which a modern agricultural undertaking is linked economically with the world around are almost all spun by a co-operative organisation. Let us follow some of them. A farmer buys his goods at a co-operative store; he borrows money from a co-operative credit association; he obtains his seed from a co-operative seed supply, his fertilisers from the Danish co-operative manure association, his fodder through the co-operative fodder association, his cement from the co-operative cement works, his electricity from an electrical company established on a co-operative basis*; and when he wants to sell his produce, he sends his milk to the co-operative dairy, his pigs to the co-operative slaughter house, his eggs to the Danish Co-operative Egg Export, and his cattle to the Co-operative Agency for Cattle Export. He places his savings in the co-operative savings banks, and from the different co-operative breeding associations he is able to get information about the best breeding stocks; he gains his knowledge regarding the amount of milk each cow should yield from the control unions, and he has at his service the best and most up-to-date theories of agriculture brought to him through the consultants appointed by the agricultural unions. By joining such a comprehensive system of co-operation he brings to his farms all the advantages of large scale farming. The growth of agricultural co-operation in Denmark has been conditioned by the large number of comparatively small holdings; on the other hand the co-operative movement has equipped the small holdings for the competitive struggle at a time when large holdings were gaining great advantage through the application of up-to-date machinery. Thanks to co-operation the adherents of large-scale farming in Denmark are easy to count. Co-operation has succeeded in giving produce from many small farms a uniformity and stability of quality which make it well fitted to maintain a place in the open world market, and this has been a decisive factor in Denmark's position in world economy.

It was Gladstone who called the co-operative movement "the greatest social wonder of the present time." The fact that in Denmark it was accomplished by ordinary men of the people makes the wonder yet more pronounced. A man of university education introduced the idea into Denmark, but, apart from that, university men have played no part in the movement. Farmers and small-holders, elementary school teachers and artisans have been the leaders in both the local societies and the large national associations, and it is to them that the credit for this enormous "social wonder" is due.

P. Manniche.

*He cannot get his agricultural machinery in this way. The dairies have a Co-operative Machinery Supply Association, but not the farmers.

POSTHUMOUS PAPERS.*

A. THEOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY.†

IT is not, I need hardly say, because of any competence of mine as a theologian or a sociologist that I am putting forward this subject for discussion, but because as a plain and simple member of the Sociological Society I feel that I and others living as we do, in very dark and troublous times, do not get that guidance from the spiritual powers that be, which would not only help us individually, but would amend the times if it aroused any general response. There is little agreement as to how problems should be dealt with, hardly ever any definite statement from the Church on controversial subjects.

THIS indefiniteness and lack of guiding power seems to result from a too abstract treatment by theology of its subject matter, which certainly includes (whatever else it may deal with) the whole world of actual human relations. But the development of modern science has led to the rise of certain methods of studying human societies, and these sociology attempts to co-ordinate. Now I venture to suggest that these methods, while they would give greater definiteness to theologians, depend in their turn, for practical application to the solution of modern problems, on ideals inherited from theology, and that for these reasons theologians and sociologists might usefully come together in certain ways.

THROUGHOUT this paper a certain view of theology will be assumed, and it seems desirable therefore to begin by an endeavour to state it clearly in a way which it is hoped will meet with very general agreement. It does not claim to be a complete view, but it endeavours to bring forward that aspect of theology which makes a closer union between theologians and sociologists possible and, indeed, urgent. And in the first place it should be mentioned that by theology is meant Christian doctrine, any other religious philosophy being differently named. Theology, then, is taken to be in the first place an interpretation of life by its highest and fullest perfection, unified as God. Theology postulates Christ as the perpetual Image of God manifested in the world, but realised in fullness in " The Son of Man." In this way we have a working conception of the nature of God. This divine humanity summed up in Christ, is further exemplified by certain persons called the saints more or less approximating to the ideal type. All Christians are " called to be saints." The function of man thus conceived as divine is to co-operate with God in setting up the Kingdom of Heaven

*The three Papers printed below belong to the *In Memoriam* of Mrs. Branford, which appeared in the April number of the SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW.

†A Paper read to the Sociological Society at Leplay House in 1921, but now for the first time printed in the REVIEW.

on earth. The one prayer used by all Christians puts this in the foreground. " Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." The Kingdom of Heaven is a society guided by love rather than ruled by force, of which the two commandments given by Christ express the prevailing spirit, and the Golden Rule the working formula. That which God has established in Heaven He wishes to see realised on earth. This must be so because the unity of God and the universe is the presupposition of theology.

THEREFORE all that theologians tell us of the nature of God and heaven is to be taken as a guide and pattern in ordering society on earth.

THEOLOGY further tells us that God cannot act contrary to His own Nature, or establish the Kingdom of God by force, for in the very nature of things the guidance of love requires the co-operation of the wills of men with that of God for its establishment ; therefore our wills are free ; God Transcendant waits for the fuller manifestation of God Immanent in man. The Church offers grace to this end.

BUT theology must involve not only a theory of the way of salvation, but also a theory of man's actual degradation. This debasement, the opposite of Heaven and its Kingdom, is called Hell. Its characteristic is the self-assertion of pride. It is unchecked individualism, and its only possible government is force.

THE world, as it is, is conceived of as being a part of this system under " the Prince of this world " just in so far as it has not been rescued from it by the Gospel message of the Kingdom of Heaven and the grace to make the Heavenly order prevail.

THE conceptions of love and force as Heaven and Hell are, of course, limiting concepts. The world as we know it presents an infinite gradation between the two, but the way of salvation is clearly from the Kingdom of this world based on force to the Kingdom of Heaven centering in Love. Thus the mediaeval Church claimed that it was higher than the temporal power just because it represented the Kingdom of Heaven on earth.

IN the attempt to study human societies by scientific methods sociologists are accustomed to start the study of man from the opposite end of the scale, not from ideals but from human origins as far as these are open to study.

AT the same time, many, perhaps most, sociologists admit the force of Aristotle's luminous doctrine that every living being is to be interpreted by its perfection rather than by its origin, the acorn by the oak rather than the oak by the acorn. At this point it becomes clear that sociology involves the recognition of ideals no less than theology.

HISTORICALLY the ideals of man and human society introduced into sociology are not unrelated to those of the Gospels. Comte, the founder of sociology, was, it has been well said, essentially "a Catholic mystic, though Parisian rather than Roman," and the central stream of sociology comes from him and from the Catholic Le Play.

SOCIOLOGY, with its theory of temporal and spiritual powers, endeavours in its own way to render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and to God the things that are God's. It builds, in short, on the great Western inheritance of the Christian Church and all that it has stood for in the history of Western civilization.

BUT the development of science and scientific methods in the last three hundred years has disclosed a greater complexity of human society than was previously thought. The world, as we now see it, is, from one point of view, like a treasure guarded by sphinxes. It is a great series of problems which humanity has to solve on the physical, the organic, and on the social planes. Applying, then, the methods of science to the study of human communities, sociology, having made some study of origins, deals secondly with changes that have led up to the present state. Next it endeavours to survey and interpret existing communities so as to develop a conceptual model of the actual state of society and its life. Finally it attempts to deal with the question how far is the present system a fulfilment of evolutionary tendencies or a lapse into degenerative tendencies, or a survival of aggravated historic evils.

THEN arises the further question, a question of applied sociology, how can the better tendencies be developed and the deteriorative checked, and even reversed?

SINCE theology and sociology are thus largely dealing with the same problems it seems clear that theologians and sociologists should be of mutual assistance in certain respects, and that if they could come together more closely they should have more valuable counsel to offer to a world sorely in need of counsel. Can we not, then, do something by inaugurating a series of conferences with theologians towards forming definite points of view in regard to the application of these ideals of man and human communities to burning questions of the day? Such views should surely be put forward as necessary resultants from careful study of the facts in the light of our common ideals, e.g., in an impoverished society such as is Europe since the war, one of the most pressing problems is as to the use and misuse of resources. But to agree on the right use of resources we must clearly first agree on a common ideal of man and society, and only so can we be in a position to come to any definite conclusion on the misuse of resources. Further, to form such conclusions we must have definite knowledge. How

are we to obtain it? Here arises the whole question of Survey work, for which at this house, named in honour of Le Play, we definitely stand—Le Play, the great catholic sociologist, with his basic surveys of Place, Work and Family or Folk. The survey is a definite endeavour to bring together and co-ordinate under these three heads all the specialist knowledge available of any district. An urgent need at the present time is the carrying out of careful surveys of all the towns and districts of this country in order that these may form the basis for the making of a better civilisation, nearer to the ideals of both theologian and sociologist. But even short of such complete surveys we have a great deal of information (e.g., reports of medical officers of health) which we can usefully compare with maps of districts in detail, and such information can be used as the basis for consideration.

But it is important to remember that the specialist criterion of the useful is not necessarily that in accord with the general interest. To discover and make manifest the bearing of that general interest is the purpose of the Survey as the sociological instrument.

By way of illustration let us consider first the misuse of resources, since this has been made so conspicuous by the war, and the after-war turmoil. All forms of objective waste, it will be admitted, may be summed up under three heads :—

1. Waste of material resources.
2. Waste of that productive cycle of organisation which results in credit.
3. Waste of life.

The engineer will tell us of the first; the doctor of the third; the banker should be able to tell us of the second; each using his own simple factual criterion. And sociologist and theologian together should surely be able to draw conclusions on all three heads from a general consideration of the facts brought forward by the specialists.

The engineer is concerned with getting the maximum units of energy out of his power supply. He seeks to minimise waste of power units or therms or whatever it may be. But it remains for the sociologist to estimate the social reactions served by the use of such power units.

Suppose all the power or heat units in coal could have been utilised since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, and used in the same way as the small proportion actually used, clearly our industrial towns would have been several times as large, as black, and as devastating to life of plant and animal as has actually been the case!

So, too, even with the doctor's tale of waste. Suppose all the children who yearly die owing to the condition of our towns could be saved by

increased medical skill, and *other conditions remained unchanged*, we should have a large population growing up to compete in the labour market or as cannon fodder; but the sociologist and, presumably, also the theologian, might have some reason for saying that death in infancy was better and less wasteful than such increase in quantity and deterioration in quality of life.

For the theologian and the sociologist the central question remains how far are our resources utilised to build up communities in which all that enriches and enhances life, music, art, gardens and playgrounds—a stimulating rather than a depressing environment—is offered not merely to a few, but to all members of these communities; since anything short of this falls short of the application of the Golden Rule, and would appear to bring the privileged few under the hard censure of the rich so frequent in the Gospels. One of the immediate results of such a coming together of theologians and sociologists might well take the form of a campaign for the provision of a more vitalising environment and voluntary transfer of much surplus wealth to common purposes.

Under this head we may note that it is often said that the income of a Rothschild, if divided up, would only give a farthing a head to everybody, but it is forgotten that if each small town in this country could enjoy as a free gift the resources of one moderately rich man, his house, his gardens and park, and his income, and each larger town that of five such men, and so on in increasing numbers, we should have such opportunities for all to share in a full social life (i.e., in civilisation) as are to be found in no country in Western Europe or America.

But any formulation of conclusions must include not only the setting up of some standard and limit of private expenditure, urgent as this is in these days of social unrest largely due to the knowledge of inordinate luxury and contrast, but also the need for development of a social conscience as to the use of social resources.

The position of the banker, for instance, seems frankly to require moralising, so that his function as the organiser of the credit resources of the community may be realised as one of public service, and may not lapse from that high ideal.

The ideal of service to the community which is a central Christian thought requires to be interpreted as applying to all modern developments, and these definitely tested by that ideal. I venture to suggest further that in dealing with these questions it will be found essential for clearness to use Comte's division of society into Temporal and Spiritual Powers and their several functions, in order to come to any agreement as to the limits of State control in these matters.

FOR if and when any such groups of sociologists and theologians can formulate definite conclusions, which they will endeavour to press upon the world, on the waste and misuse of human life and resources, the question will at once arise, how far are we to press for changes through Acts of Parliament, or through some change in government, and how far to confine ourselves to an endeavour (which must in any case certainly be made) to arouse the conscience of individuals ?

I WILL not venture to answer this question, but merely note that any such group will have to deal with it sooner or later. Extreme pressing of the theological position as I have put it would result in the practical identification of the State with the Devil, and many quotations from early popes and bishops can be made in support of this view, yet in an imperfect world such as ours some force is clearly at times necessary. The spiritual power should be surely prepared with some guidance as to the measure of its employment required by the times. Meantime I would urge that for the enlightenment of us poor erring mortals, puzzled how to deal with the troubles of our times, more definite guidance from the leaders of spiritual life and thought is urgently needed, and that this can best be supplied by a working alliance between theologian and sociologist.

B. CO-OPERATORS AND THE COMMUNITY.

AN ADDRESS AT KETTERING.

FOR most people, two rival ideals of society divide the field at the present time. They are :

(1) INDIVIDUALISM, thought of as competition and struggle for success over others—the object being to attain a Paradise of well-being for self and family, under a rivalry often intense enough to generate indifference as to whether the less successful are plunged into purgatory and the defeated into hell.

(2) SOCIALISM, or the use of organised force (whether applied by constitutional or revolutionary means, is, how the standpoint be taken, immaterial) to remedy this state of affairs and to bring about a happier condition of society for all.

BOTH ideals concentrate on an abstract " individual " and an abstract " society," rather than on the actual people and places that we know. Attention is directed to such questions as whether there should be any private property, rather than on the question : " Is the condition of our town satisfactory," or " Does the town we live in give us and our children those opportunities of life and development to which we, as sharers of civilisation, have a right ? "

EVEN co-operators, in spite of their concrete tradition, are tending to this abstractness of view. The "Wholesale" advertises "buy our products and help the Co-operative Commonwealth." But where is the Co-operative Commonwealth? Is it to be found in Kettering? If not there, it is certainly not to be found in this country.

TRUE co-operation offers (as we of Leplay House also claim to do) a third alternative to this current dilemma of individualism or socialism. It claims that, under certain conditions, voluntary union can combine individuals and render force unnecessary; that, indeed, the individual is naturally connected in neighbourly relations with others, and that it is the further development of these relations which constitutes a true community. In such a community force is only exceptionally needed; and for the driving of force there is substituted the pull of fellowship and religion. Let us make no mistake about it; unless it embodies religion in the shape of definite ideals of feeling and behaviour, co-operation will lose its impetus and lapse into custom and routine. Is not that just what has to some extent happened to the co-operative movement?

WE all know that it started as an attempt to carry social ideals into practise with the object of actually setting up co-operative communities. Owen and his early followers were consumed with the desire not just to improve conditions for the poor, but to make a new world of co-operative communities.

THE Rochdale Pioneers in 1844 when they first registered their Society described its objects thus:

To raise capital in £1 shares, in order —

1. To establish a store.
2. To manufacture.
3. To purchase or rent land for cultivation by members, and further, "that as soon as practicable this Society shall proceed to arrange powers of production, distribution, education and government, or in other words, to establish a self-supporting home colony of united interests, or assist other societies in establishing such colonies."

THESE co-operative communities were to embody the ideals of fellowship, i.e., co-operation was an attempt to apply Christian ethics to social affairs.

BUT we remain contented at a much lower level. Although we, as co-operators, have now command of a good deal of capital, the use we make of it leaves the community much where it was. The weight of the co-operative movement is turned rather to the political support of the Labour movement (which means a substitution of socialism

for voluntary co-operation), rather than to the use of its powers for the actual development of a better community here or anywhere else, wherever co-operators are strong enough. The proof of this is on the one hand in the strikes of the co-operative employees against co-operators, and on the other in the condition of such a co-operative town as Kettering. For though Kettering can well bear comparison with any other industrial town, yet it is a long way short of what it could be made if co-operators maintained their early enthusiasm for community-making. It seems almost that co-operators are no longer ardent believers in their power to bring about actual local " eutopias," or the best possible here and now. Their attention is no longer on this making of E-u-t-o-p-i-a-s (as we at Leplay House name the process of betterment) as the problem they have to solve, but seems to be distracted between " business " and " politics." Business is what has to be done in Kettering ; " politics " means talk at Westminster and abstractions in general. Labour politics, in aiming by a devious route at the production of " Utopia " (or the unplaced ideal) at sometime everywhere, meantime tends perhaps to distract attention from Kettering and its problems, and so with each place in turn.

THIS is what the Civics Movement is out to remedy ; and its first allies should be co-operators, because it recalls co-operators to their traditional claims. In fact if enthusiasm is directed to politics so far as to leave co-operation without the ardour of a religion and its ideals, voluntary co-operation must languish. There are two traditional ways of appealing to human beings, one is the way of force and the other the way of emotion. It is a curious fact about human nature that it is only a minority who are ready to pursue their own interests in a merely " reasonable " manner. Most people get bored and determine to take a short cut through competition or war, although you may prove to them that this can only benefit some if any. They hope they may be the ones benefited and chance it. So war and competition continue. They can only be fought by rival ideals ; never by common sense alone, but only by what we may call glorified common sense transmuted by emotion into an ideal.

THEREFORE voluntary co-operation can only spread and flourish in proportion as it is a religion, or rather the application of a religion. It must be based on the ideals of love and fellowship, it must aim at what some people call the Kingdom of God and others Eutopia ; the name may perhaps not matter so much, but the thing matters greatly ; and it is of the essence of voluntary co-operation that it aims at contributions to bring about this Kingdom of God on earth by our own united effort here and now, in the community in which we are, if not in some other actual and local community which we are intending to set up as soon as possible !

THE point is that as co-operators, we cannot believe in relegating this matter of the Community to legislators and bureaucrats at Westminster. We claim to be able to work out our own salvation, and we call on our neighbours to help us in this task. This is the spirit of co-operation. It is what it stands for. In so far as we preserve this spirit, so far shall we find we can go on from small things to great; but we must have faith, and we must have *vision*, if we are to take real steps towards the making of an earthly Paradise.

WE need to know what we want; what kind of a place we should like to live in; what kind of things we should refuse to force on others through their poverty; what opportunities we want for our children. We should know something of what has been done in the past; we may well get encouragement from the life and development of famous cities of Greece and Italy, cities often no larger than Kettering; and then we should go on to compare with them the actual conditions of Kettering! We should make a survey of Kettering, its slums and typical homes, its workshops and factories, its public gardens and playgrounds, its opportunities for recreation and artistic creation, its public buildings and public-houses, churches and chapels, its educational resources, schools, museums, libraries, and art galleries. Then having made our survey we should go on to make a plan for an ideal Kettering to be realised in some definite period, say, 20 years. Just as the survey is mapped, so should the ideal plan be mapped, for this will both make it more concrete for us, and also it will show the need in many cases of securing sites and open spaces now when they may be had. It will be found that certain parts of this plan can best be done through the action of the local authority, while others will depend on voluntary action. If such a plan is agreed upon, and shown in Co-operative Halls, in the public library, and in churches and chapels, individuals as well as "Co-operators" will be found ready to carry out some part of it for the sake of the community; but the central need will be the securing of a Co-operative Institute or College which shall focus the community-making enthusiasm, or civic spirit, without which nothing great can be done. For this the co-operators of Kettering must depend on their own resources. Unless they are sufficiently filled with the co-operative spirit to will the development of such a place, it is not likely to be developed, and without it Kettering will not develop from a small manufacturing town of the most squalid epoch in history—the 19th century—to become the centre of art and industry, which the co-operative spirit of its citizens ought to make it. For this double task of acting as the thought-centre of the community, and also as the life-centre—the place for music, art, drama, discussion, we need here a Co-operative College or Institute. It should be co-operative because we want the co-operative view of life put forward, we want Kettering to stand for this throughout the country, to be a

place of co-operation, pilgrimage, and renewal. Yet in being co-operative it will also be civic. It will concentrate on the possibilities of Kettering, it will aim at its greatness, it will focus the soul of Kettering, and endeavour to make the town into a worthy expression of that soul.

THE educational traditions of the co-operative movement are expressed in such schools as this in which we are assembled, and in the various educational activities of co-operators, but so far they have not sufficiently expressed themselves in bricks and mortar. We have yet to see co-operators undertake anything comparable to a mediæval cathedral for the expression of their ideals. The records of a Town Council of the 14th century show that the citizens there resolved to build such a cathedral that later people would exclaim with amazement that it should ever have been undertaken. It is something of this spirit—a flaming enthusiasm that goes beyond common sense—that we need if such a co-operative and civic centre is to be established. Perhaps a Civic Society might be the best way of working towards it. Leaflets on Civic Societies have been distributed, which I hope people will take home and read. This movement for Civic Societies has sprung up in the last few years. It is an attempt to redevelop that care for the local community which modern conditions have tended to diminish through the pull to London or other big towns. The Civic Society is, of course, purely a voluntary and co-operative undertaking. If it were possible to establish one in Kettering, it would not demand that its members be confined to those who co-operate in other ways, but it might centre round the co-operative developments of Kettering, and find a temporary home in its educational rooms until it had roused the citizens to set up the Co-operative College which would give it a permanent home.

SUCH Civic Societies commonly undertake surveys of their towns as a starting point, but usually lack a convenient centre for showing these, and suggested improvements. They sometimes, however, hold exhibitions of these which are of great value.

I SUGGEST that if it were possible it would be very desirable to start such a Civic Society at Kettering, to aim at a survey and, if possible, to get some town planner to visit the town and make considered suggestions for an ideal plan in collaboration with a local group. Such an ideal plan is not quite the same as the town plan which Kettering, with other places, will be obliged to make within the next year or two under the Town Planning Acts. It goes further and provides for matters not necessarily included in the other, yet they should not be independent of each other. The ideal includes and transcends the minimum which will be obligatory. It includes above all the Co-operative College, for which I have been pleading. Such a Civic

Society would aim at an early date of holding an exhibition to show Kettering "Past, Present and Possible," so that the people of Kettering might realise what they inherit in limitations and in possibilities, and during the week of exhibition they would have lantern lectures on cities of the past, on town planning and so on. After a winter of such activities, it might be possible to get the Co-operative College started, and if not after the first winter then after the second. Faith and vision are needed rather than money. Without faith and vision, no amount of money will really help us, but with them the money will follow. I have not dealt with the further and important question of the relations between Kettering and the countryside, but this too will fall under the province of the Civic Society, and these relations can and should be largely developed. Kettering is already a market town; it will be, we hope, a city of pilgrimage, a joy if not of the whole earth, yet of a considerable area of neighbouring country, and a place of inspiration for co-operators elsewhere.

C. FREEDOM OF THOUGHT.*

I AM sorry to say that owing to illness I have been deprived of the privilege of hearing previous addresses on Freedom of Thought, so that I must take my chance of repeating what has already been said in drawing attention to certain preliminary considerations on Freedom of Thought, which I desire to emphasise: considerations which Prof. Bury certainly does not stress, though in one sentence on the persecution of the Christians under the Roman Empire he does make the statement that (p. 42) the spirit of Christianity was "incompatible with the spirit and basis of Roman society."

I SUGGEST not only that this sentence contains the key to the failure of the Roman Empire to tolerate Christian thought, but that any order of society habitually discourages thought which is incompatible with its spirit and basis. And panic, showing itself in violent persecution, results from the realisation that the attack is practically dangerous combined with the determination not to meet it by reform from within.

FURTHER, I suggest that all constructive thought on human affairs and on the nature of the world depends upon a certain framework of ideas and feeling, upon certain assumptions or hypotheses, which form the social heritage of the thinker and is so far conditioned and not free; while what is called "free thought" is an attempt to attack

*A paper read, in October, 1925, to the Hastings Branch of the Historical Association in connexion with a study circle using Prof. Bury's HISTORY OF FREE THOUGHT as the textbook. This was the last paper written by Mrs. Branford.

the prevalent framework (or part of its assumptions) in the interest of a rival set of assumptions not necessarily clearly present to the mind of the "free thinker" but assumed by him. For instance, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were not "free thinkers" in this sense, though they had remarkable freedom of thought within that framework of ideas and feeling provided by the Greek City State. This they never attacked but pursued constructive paths of thought on this basis; nor was the sacredness of the City State ever directly attacked in antiquity; Rome, on the one hand, absorbed in itself and centralised that sacredness, and on the other hand continued and spread abroad a simulacrum of the City State wherever her Empire spread, so that to-day the splendour of the Roman cities, newly discovered in Africa, astonishes our impoverished world. But Rome also stood for the Eastern and Barbarian conception of Empire, of the dominating conqueror, masquerading under the cloak of the "sacred city."

THE spirit of Christianity was obviously alien to any such Imperialism, since it substituted love for force as the motive power in society, while at its heart was enshrined the Holy Family, with the sacred city only in the second place. It is the special attribute of the Middle Ages that the social implications of christian thought were developed, and the family recognised as the typical relation to be reflected in the village community and in the city. Thus was realised a new sacredness of human societies from the village clustered round its church to the cities with their sanctifying cathedrals, which were the inspiration of their surrounding dioceses; and it was seen also in the guilds which arose for special purposes within these sanctified cities.

THIS framework of thought and feeling depended upon that spiritual power, the Catholic Church, which was independent of, and often opposed to, the temporal power inheriting from the Roman Empire —whether in the form of the mediæval Empire or of the rising national empires called States. During the mediæval period, however, the spiritual power was able to influence these so largely as to restrict warfare, and to create a civilisation on the whole predominantly peaceful in which the arts of life could develop.

WITHIN this general outlook, thought was not repressed, but on the contrary it was encouraged, witness the rise of Universities in the mediæval world, the preservation of learning in the monasteries of its earlier period; witness also the great names, at once critical and constructive, of Thomas Aquinas and of Dante.

PERSECUTIONS arose inevitably when this framework of thought was attacked in an age which had not the historical knowledge to realise that physical persecution is in the end futile, and that free thought

can be most successfully checked by those methods of discouragement which are commonly pursued in modern times, such as the refusal to appoint any but "safe" men to office, the refusal to publish subversive matter, the social boycott of "cranks," &c., &c. We can all recall the well-known instance of public opinion forcing Thackeray, as editor of the *Cornhill*, to refuse to continue the publication of Ruskin's UNTO THIS LAST as too shocking to the current faith in Political Economy.

No! It can hardly be expected in any age that a well entrenched system will refrain from doing its best to discourage those who attack it. But opinions as to the most successful methods of discouragement vary from age to age, and are much influenced by the degree of fear felt among the supporters of the established system. Up to and during what we may call the central mediæval period, the 12th Century, the preference was for such measures as Excommunication; and the Bishops and leaders of the Church mitigated the popular feeling which demanded the death of heretics, and sometimes saved them from the mob as the Bishop did at Liege in 1144. Peter, the Cantor of the University of Paris, who died as a Cistercian in 1198, protested against any such infliction of the death penalty on heretics, admitting at most imprisonment, but we may note a marked increase of severity going on, in proportion as fear of heretical developments increased. The Albigenses attacked the central christian conception of the family, not merely the christian symbols, creeds and sacraments. When we read, regarding the Albigenses, in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (11th ed.), certainly an unprejudiced source, that "the mass of believers were freed from all moral prohibition and all religious obligation," we can hardly expect toleration for such believers in the Middle Ages while in England to-day Communists are forcibly interfered with on the ground that their teachings are likely to lead to sedition.*

BUT undoubtedly the fear and horror produced by the Albigensian doctrines caused widespread cruelties in their suppression early in the 13th Century, and this habit of mind of forcible suppression of "wrong thinking" grew in force from generation to generation, and gave rise to the Inquisition and its evils. But the mediæval system of thought was so welded together and constituted such a home for the spirit of man, that it is easy to understand how those who loved it, and the social order it produced, would feel the danger lest such attacks on religion and on morals should upset that prevalent and valuable type of society, as in the end they helped to do.

THE predominantly communal and neighbourly life of the Middle Ages gave way to the predominantly individualistic life of the Renaissance period, which finally blended with the Industrial period to

*The reference is to the prosecution of twelve Communists in October, 1925, for sedition and their subsequent sentence of six months' imprisonment. (Editor, SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW.)

produce the confused medley of the present day. But we may notice that it was only after religious free thought had been prevalent for many centuries, that the political economists of the early 19th Century were able to work out, from the implications of "free thought," a system of thought for their age openly dependent upon an entirely new set of assumptions as to the nature of man and of human society, and so to do their part in bringing about the present chaos. For thought is not an end in itself, it leads to action and grows out of it. The thoughts of the sailor are not the thoughts of the peasant, nor his the thoughts of the townsman; the thoughts of the citizen of no mean city are different from the thoughts of the *entrepreneur* of an industrial town, and the thoughts of men do not remain mere thoughts, but they realise themselves in the world men make. In the middle ages, because of the religion they shared to an infinitely greater extent than with us, men thought the same kind of thoughts and dreamed the same dreams. When a great East window was wanted in the 13th Century for York Cathedral the order was given to a glazier of Coventry. He was not given an artist's sketch, he was not even told what subject should occupy it, but merely the size of window to be filled by the glass. It was not necessary to tell him, for it was obvious that as he was a right thinking man and could limn and colour well, he would put in what would appeal to all as the right thing for the place, and as he was a noted craftsman it was known that he would make a window worthy of the cathedral. This unity of thought and feeling was what made cathedrals possible.

It was the gradual rediscovery of the learning, beauty and glory of Greece which broke up this spiritual unity. It was the failure of the church of the later mediæval period to reconcile the tradition of Greece with the tradition of Christianity, which is at bottom what is meant by the assertion that the Middle Ages endeavoured to suppress freedom of thought. The educated classes largely broke away from the guidance of the church and adopted the new learning, and in so doing they created that gulf between the classes which is at the root of the trouble of the modern world.

It must be admitted that this failure was inconceivably grave. It should have been possible for the Church to modify the fabric of thought, and to enrich it without overthrowing it. Thought should have been more freely used for constructive purposes. The wrong turn was taken, as Mr. Chesterton has well said, and the promise of the earlier Middle Ages was never fulfilled. Somewhere in the 13th Century, it is generally admitted, was the turning point. I suggest that it was the growing tendency caused by fear to emphasise the suppression of heresy—the fear of new outlooks and their possible consequences—which constituted this turning point. This fear was

almost certainly connected with the fact that the Church was itself increasingly permeated with worldly spirit. Nothing produces fear so much as a bad conscience. The Church chose the way of repression of the discontented rather than the way of inner reform. So panic grew and repression increased in severity. The new social problems were not solved but shelved. Panic and persecution are the marks of consciousness of this failure. If attention had been called rather to the reconciliation of the new thought with Christian tradition not only in logic as in the great work of St. Thomas, but in natural science and in the outlook on life generally, all might have gone differently.

THE Church would have maintained its purity against material temptations, to which its leaders fell victims under the influence of the new thought apart from christian tradition, and so through its position as the leader and reconciler of thought, new and old, would have retained its influence over the governing classes. Then the Free Cities would perhaps not have gone down before the hired soldiers of the despots, and might have become with their peaceful Leagues the typical European organisation, together with Cantonal Federations on the Swiss model, instead of that position being taken by the ambitious National States, claiming freedom from the common Spiritual Power, which actually developed and broke up Christendom into warring fragments. Peaceful peasant communities, rather than subjected countrysides impoverished by taxation, would then have been typical of rural Europe.

A SPIRITUAL Power embodying and reconciling its great social inheritances from Palestine and Greece would have made Europe, instead of the tyrant of the world, its enlightener and helper.

As things were, the rival systems of thought clashed and broke each other. We live to-day upon the fragments.

I ONCE asked Mr. G. P. Gooch, who had been talking of freedom, to tell me what he meant by it. He replied, "Freedom arises when the temporal power is weak and when the spiritual power is shattered into little bits." The Middle Ages exemplified the first of Mr. Gooch's strange conditions, but not the second, just as to-day the second but not the first holds.

POSSIBLY this twentieth century may see a building up once more of the Spiritual Power by the joint efforts of theologians and sociologists, a spiritual power embodying this time the whole European inheritance of science as well as of religion, and then it may go on to construct a world worthy of its thought.

FOR thought is creative and is to be judged by what it creates. It is Athens that justifies Greek thought, it is the progress in civilisation

from the 8th to the 13th Century, after the Barbarian destruction, that justifies mediæval thought.

Our sympathy with thought claiming to be free from the bonds of any system must depend upon the nature of the system it attacks and the implications of the system it would substitute. But as no human system is perfect or final it seems obvious that criticism should be allowed in the hope that some criticism will be of value.

Is there, in conclusion, any sense in which we can say that the present age has attained an opportunity of evaluating systems of thought and of standing outside them for that purpose, as the Middle Ages could not?

Yes, the present age is perhaps the first to have a general knowledge of history, and this gives us the material which enables us to see how in the past ages men who supposed their thought was free were really dominated by a general framework of thought prevalent at the time, or by some fragment of such a framework.

We know, therefore, that our own thought is so dominated, and just as the first step in wisdom was taken by Socrates in the refusal to call himself a sophist, or wise man, because he knew that he was not wise, though free from many of the prejudices of the ordinary Greek, so the first step towards freedom of thought is probably taken by the sociologist who recognises that his thought, too, is conditioned. To some extent, then, we can be outside our own system in a way impossible for them, and can realise the relativity of all human thought.

THE ETHICS OF BIRTH CONTROL.

I. The Logic of the Situation.

The ultimate arguments for and against deliberate control of conception may be those of the old rhyme:

"Tobacco is a filthy weed:
I like it."

To rely wholly, however, upon the logic of the wish or the logic of inevitability is merely to accept for ourselves an inhibition to which protagonists and antagonists are not subject. It substitutes drift for mastery. The aggressively adaptive temperament, whether *pro* or *con*, prefers the logic of fact and reason, and at least the illusion of conscious guidance in public policy. Moreover, facts and arguments are not without effect upon attitudes, after all. Of late, even Catholics have stepped down, *ex cathedra in arenam*, giving to Neo-Malthusians a Macbeth for their MacDuff.

Lest we seem to be fighting men of straw, the statements in opposition which follow have with few exceptions been drawn from actual opponents of birth control. Outstanding among these opponents is my friend Rev. John M. Cooper, who, as an officially approved spokesman of liberal Catholicism in the United States, has himself marshalled the resources of statistics and authority to corroborate dogma. I wish here to pay my respects to his scholarship, his skill, his sportsmanship and his sincerity, as well as what seem to me his errors. The citations made below are, unless otherwise stated, from his pamphlet called Birth Control.

Cooper, with the liberalism of complete faith that nature cannot contradict dogma, is apparently willing to waive theological argument, and meet the adversary upon a basis of natural sanctions. It is upon such a basis that we have tried his steel. "If I . . . were taking my ethics from purely humanitarian premises, I should still hold the view I now hold. For it seems to me that if we admit artificial contraception as ethical, we are driven inexorably in all ethical consistency to loosen and negate the ethical standards of sex all along the line."

II. The Ethical Objections.

A writer not opposed to birth control in principle is quoted by Father Cooper to the effect that currently used methods "are all more or less offensive to persons of refined disposition." What Cooper calls "social intuitions" (thus successfully dodging "instincts") have produced an almost unbroken and universal tradition of repulsion. "To disregard instinctive repugnances in matters of sex-morality is

exceedingly dangerous, and would lead logically to the toleration of acts which all decent persons condemn." "Most simple peoples on the lower cultural levels are little addicted to such practices."

"No supposed beneficial consequences can make good a practice which is, in itself, immoral." "To admit contraception as under some circumstances ethical and at the same time to counsel 'moderation' and adequate fulfillment of responsibilities is worse than playing with fire. It is starting a conflagration." "The groups that admit and practice contraception, for whatsoever reason . . . do not practice it in 'moderation,' nor have we a . . . hope that we can ever get them to." "The prevention of conception and the interference with it once it has begun are fundamentally the same . . . The one is quite as unmoral as the other . . . justifies . . . if they are permitted to violate such a fundamental law of nature, in violating any artificial or economic law which you . . . might pass." "To defeat Nature in marriage is as criminal as to commit murder. No excuse is possible —neither financial reasons nor any other." "We regard these practices . . . quite as immoral as adultery . . . or rather a little more so, because adultery . . . does not commit any outrage upon nature, nor pervert nature's functions." "The cardinal sin of wilful sterility in marriage means death."

As Cardinal Gibbons seemed to prefer almost any evil to almost any means of control, so Father Vaughan, apparently prefers abortion to contraception: the reduction of abortions through contraception "is driving out a devil by the prince of devils." "Whatever positively and of set purpose frustrates, for the sake of animal pleasure, the divinely constituted end of the marriage act, whatever extinguishes in the mother the love of offspring and the instinct of motherhood, whatever puts personal or social convenience above the duty of caring for the child in the womb or of rearing it tenderly when born, all this degrades the individual, extinguishing in the soul the semblance of a human being, . . . There can be only one legitimate exercise of the marriage rights—namely, the natural one, the one which we know to be in accordance with His Divine Wisdom."

THE Catholic implication that sex is sin is seen, when birth control is in consequence declared inconsistent with "modern" sex education, which tries to produce a clean point of view in sex life. Modern sex education declares against physical "sex-necessity"; admitting birth control, it is claimed, assumes "sex-necessity."

ANOTHER similar assumption is based in part upon the foregoing. It is one of those attitudes which, once taken, tend to make themselves seem valid by setting up a responding chain of attitudes, a reciprocal or circular response. It is that physical intercourse not "sanctified"

by procreative will is inevitably gross, and sanctified by nothing whatever. " Contraception makes the vicious aspect of sex relations easier of accomplishment. It is further assumed that they make this accomplishment not only possible but inevitable ; not only inevitable but irresponsible and selfishly unrestrained : " In its essential tendencies, it eliminates from marital life the very elements that throw about that life the mantle of the sacred and the reverent. In the long run, it undermines higher love itself. It thus tends to break down the loftier reverence and love between husband and wife." " Moral aberrations . . . strip sex passion of the normal controls and correctives and counterchecks placed upon it by nature and the God of nature, and leaves it shorn and naked in all its degrading and degraded grossness and unloveliness." Again, Cooper refers to " the stimuli to . . . altruism that offset the stimulus to selfish egoism given by physical sex gratification." " How often does [love] descend to a level of naked passion ! " " All meddling . . . to secure facultative sterility degrades the wife to the level of a prostitute." These themes reappear in the attitudes of a Protestant woman minister of the so-called " purist " or " purity " school of thought : " By consenting to . . . preventives, she [woman] rivets her chains . . . lends herself to her own humiliation, becoming thereby a creature that even the prostitute of the street need not envy . . . The very essence of prostitution lies in the fact that a function has been so used as to frustrate its evident end."

" THROUGH the Law cometh sin," may be carried over into modern psychological lingo as " through social taboo cometh the sense of conflict and guilt." Birth control, therefore, can become undeniably wrong by giving the knowledge of good and evil to the unenlightened —to " those who may, in good faith and without awareness of the similarities between birth control and other sex aberrations, practice contraceptive measures." Cooper admits by implication that such persons are not quite on the level of prostitutes or adulterers—they can still, like Pagans, save themselves when the gospel is brought to them. But he also implies that by learning of these previously unsuspected similarities they become, objectively at least, convicted of sin. Subsequent practice becomes a yielding to temptation.

ANOTHER ethical line of attack : " artificial birth control tends . . . to isolate sex passion from its natural controls and correctives, love and parenthood." " Indulgence in sex gratification in itself and isolated from its natural correctives, unselfish love and devoted and sacred parenthood, stamp in and harden and aggravate man's inborn selfishness and egoism, first of all in the great field of sex itself, and by irradiation in much of the rest of human life." " Man is apt to be so much more polygamous and inconstant in his impulses." " What is the usual effect on the spiritual life of those who, through continued control, keep their families down to next to nothing ? This

is probably the most serious single consequence of the current fashion." Birth control "isolates physical sex gratification from its normal unselfish accompaniments and correctives, centres attention upon the self-regarding phases of sex, and helps to enthrone selfishness and flabbiness at the very heart of character. It reduces the marital relation to a level not superior to or different from the level of solitary vice and extra-marital indulgence." "Woman . . . must free herself from bondage to man's sensual demands . . . if not for her own sake, nor for his, then for the sake of the coming race." Thus, aside from tradition, instinct or dogma, the only attempt to explain the sinfulness of sex *per se* is that, if unrestrained it runs amok. "Husband and wife who indulge in any form of this practice, . . . cannot help coming to regard each other to a great extent as mutual instruments of sensual gratification, rather than as co-operators with the Creator." "Woman's body and soul are made for maternity, and she can never find true repose for either without it." "To admit [that birth control] . . . is necessary to protect the women of America is something, I think, none of the women whose fathers were pioneers and whose mothers were the mothers of large families will for a moment admit."

THERE are "many reasons" for birth control "and all of them . . . based on selfish motives." It is not progress nor civilisation, but "a slavish subservience to the flesh." "The marital sex relation itself carried out normally and honestly, is by its open-eyed acceptance of prospective parenthood lifted up out of the purely physical plane into the higher moral and spiritual plane, and self-centred sex gratification becomes surcharged with higher energies of a moral and deeply altruistic order."

IF it be necessary for individual or societal reasons to limit the family, continence is ethically superior to any other method. If those "eager to help the 'slum-mother' . . . would give but the . . . time . . . in teaching her that her body is her own, and at the same time instruct her husband in the hygiene and sanity of self-control, in a single generation there would be no 'slum-mother' to teach." "When . . . spiritual birth is accomplished, the problem of birth control will have solved itself."

III. THE OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

IT is assumed by certain objectors to controlled parenthood that artificial=unnatural, and that unnatural=vicious or repulsive. This is an obvious fallacy of the "undistributed middle term." Nearly everything we do is artificial in the sense of having an element of conscious or social control. Nature discards life as well as creates and preserves it; selection partakes of the creative. Artificial selection for conception and nurture under the best of conditions co-operates

with, or rather continues and develops, the creative evolutionary process. Deliberate and ordered intelligence and its use are not unnatural.

UNNATURALNESS in the other, or disparaging sense, is a matter of taste, and taste is largely composed of attitudes acquired through the folkways, and therefore modifiable for cause. Æsthetic objections may be outgrown, or they may be outweighed by more cogent social obligations. Moralists should be the last to put taste before duty. But, aside from this, the objections on the ground of taste do not go to the principle but rather to the method of control. Other more æsthetic acceptable medical methods may be found. Anyone to whom medical methods are incorrigibly repulsive is not compelled to them by the general acceptance of the principle, but is free to practice continence—or for that matter incontinence. Finally, if contracepted unions be less fully satisfying than those in which a consciousness of the conceptive process or purpose is a part, it is not unfitting that this should be so ; but even so, the contracepted union is not necessarily degraded in the comparison, any more than good lithographs or victrola records or decaffeinized coffee are to be condemned because there exist corresponding originals.

IT is not surprising that there is little birth control among primitives, or those in an alleged state of nature, when we realise their frequent ignorance of much more elemental facts, and the very recent and still inadequate state of information among our own medicine men and priests. The positive sanctions on fecundity, on the other hand, are easily traceable to its high group-survival value : raising up children to the Fatherland was patriotic (and to Mother Church it was religious). Supernatural sanctions are given to such matters, though there be real underlying reasons which are social-economic. Sterility was negatively sanctioned as a curse.

VARIOUS sexual deviations have been condemned by the theological moralists on various social and traditional grounds, but chiefly because, if they weren't forbidden, they would be committed ; and they're wrong ! Without for a moment approving these aberrations, many of which may be demonstrably causative of social disharmony, inefficiency and misery, we can point out that accepted practices, such as celibacy or the establishment of homes, could be proved wrong by identical logic. As the man remarked : " I am so glad I don't like carrots, because, if I liked carrots, I'd have to eat carrots ; and I just hate carrots." Furthermore, there is hardly any moral taboo, even those on incest, cannibalism, corpses, that is not found absent in some peoples. The social morality or immorality even of such extreme practices must be determined in each case by a study of results in the given environment ; and in our own profoundly different situation we must still test our taboos by a study of results, in personal, family, and community integrity.

To class contraception with abortion (or murder) is largely a matter of sentiment, if not of dogma. For every actual conception some millions of living germs "die in vain." Abortion, too, can be disapproved on grounds quite independent of the arguments against contraception; yet abortion is permitted for the safety of a mother. Even the legitimate abortions might be largely obviated by birth control. Father Ryan and Father Vaughan prefer adultery and abortion to birth control: verily they have their reward.

THE argument from irrational taboo or "instinct" is, to be sure, recognised by the opponents as a weak one. In the case of sex taboo, which has so many and inconsistant ramifications in various peoples, it hardly offers even a presumption in its own favour. Love, in the romantic conjugal sense, is a comparatively recently developed complex, not a primitive attitude; "cave-man stuff" is not given supernatural sanction merely because it is primitive.

THAT birth control involves certain social dangers is admitted, but it is not admitted that it is wrong because it can be misused. The translation of the Bible into the vernacular was once opposed as dangerous. Anæsthetics and inoculation were so opposed—are still, in some quarters. So is sex education. Any great power, or the invention which controls it, is dangerous, and its responsible use must be learned. Freedom is based upon control, and only so is it morally educative or ethically significant. In facing dangers our judgment must balance the possible gains and the possible losses; in this case the gains seem to neo-Malthusians to outweigh, though they are not necessarily blind to possible abuses.

COOPER attempts to correct a common misapprehension among non-Catholics, and possibly among Catholics themselves: "The vague feeling . . . that within the marriage union conjugal intercourse is indecent or only reluctantly tolerated, is in no sense an outgrowth of Catholic teaching, and it can find no shadow of support therein." This is a distinct advance upon the attitudes of the "purity" type of moralist. But, in the absence of more authoritative reinterpretations, it is not difficult to find passages from Aquinas and the early Fathers which (while they may doubtless be matched from non-Catholic sources) look to a layman rather like the "shadow of support therein" to which Father Cooper refers. And in protesting that Catholic doctrine respects bodily satisfactions, Cooper himself seems unconsciously to re-display fundamental assumptions or "conditioned emotional responses which seem to link the body and sex exclusively with the coarse, the discordant or unesthetic, the abnormal and the sinful." It was the same Tertullian cited confidently by Father Ryan before the Congressional Committee, who wrote:—

"THE Lord Himself said, 'Whoever has seen a woman with a view to concupiscence, has already violated her in his heart.' But has he who

has seen her with a view to marriage done so less or more? What if he have even married her?—which he would not do had he not desired her with a view to marriage, and seen her with a view to concupiscence; unless it is possible for a wife to be married whom you have not seen or desired. . . . . nor yet is the mean through which she becomes a married woman any other than that through which withal (she becomes) an adulteress. It is laws which seem to make the difference between marriage and fornication; through diversity of illicitness, not through the nature of the thing itself. Besides, what is the thing which takes place in all men and women to produce marriage and fornication? Commixture of the flesh, of course; the concupiscence whereof the Lord put on the same footing with fornication. 'Then,' says (some one), 'are you by this time destroying first—that is, single—marriage too?' And not without reason (if I am); inasmuch as it, too, consists of that which is the essence of fornication. Accordingly, the best things for a man is not to touch a woman; and accordingly the virgin's is the principal sanctity, because it is free from affinity with fornication."

THE permitted relations to which Cooper refers seem at best to be more intimately regulated and circumscribed by artificial precept and injunction and inquisition and sanction of the church than are those of the neo-Malthusian couple by medical advice. And any intercourse not so permitted is still considered, *ipso facto*, foul and anathema. Furthermore, it tends to be befouled by the cursing: in the minds of those who care about the sanctions of the church and conform to "virtue," and again in the behaviour of the type of people who don't care if they *are* wicked.

IT is difficult to argue with anyone who takes the stand that physical gratification is not a legitimate end in itself. This is not to say that, alone, it is a high objective. It may of course be or become also a means to some other end. It has been biologically a means to secure procreative contacts in the lower animals, if we can assume such gratification from the analogies in behaviour. This needs no teleological explanation, however. It is the biologist or theologist who sees the purpose, not "Nature" or the animals. Yet if deistic purpose be claimed, there is a tacit admission that procreative desire—"philoprogenitiveness" or "effective desire for offspring"—is not alone enough to perpetuate the race under adverse conditions. "Were it not for this physical appeal, many would shirk the task from selfish considerations." Some intercourse, therefore, must be undertaken for its own sake, even in the absence of birth control. If, then, procreation be the only divinely sanctioned objective, the immediate enjoyment of physical union becomes a sort of bribe, or on less intelligent levels a trick by God, rather than an ethically relevant reward for effort. It is like Christmas parties as inducement to Sunday school attendance: they are not gone to for the purpose of permission to go to Sunday school, but too often *vice versa*. Has God, then, arranged this sin?

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To confine physical sex life to mere reproduction is not necessarily to spiritualise it. On the contrary, it may be argued that this exclusively

physical limitation is characteristic of animals which ignore the opposite sex except in the rutting season. Modern conditions give us sex energies in excess of race-survival needs, and to thwart their sublimation in conjugal affection is not only to court conflict and neurosis, but is as reactionary as were the puritan attempts to ban music, colour and gaiety, which are sublimations of the ear, the eye, and other underused faculties and surplus energies. It is no more reasonable to ban the culture and arts of love than to reduce food, clothing or shelter to mere necessities of life.

A GIVEN amount of gratification of any sense is not gluttony merely by vice of its *quantity*, but rather because of its competition with or impairment of other functions more valuable to the organism (or so considered). This applies, it seems, in sex as well as in taste. In so far as gratification does not undermine social efficiency, it cannot be considered vicious. Gratification may be an end in itself, either with or without being evil ; it may be also a means to an end irrelevant to itself, as nutrition or reproduction, or it may be a means to a higher, relevant and allied end, as in conjugal affection or musical appreciation.

ON the positive side it may be pointed out that quite as many psychic, emotional and æsthetic elements have accreted about physical intimacy and conjugal union as around procreation and parental-filial affections, and that the former are as socially valid as the latter. It can be agreed that some forms of sex-contact lack any element of sublimation and are socially valueless or tend to rob society. To extend the epithets " lust " or " sensuality " beyond these " abberrations " is unfair begging of the question. The pseudo-purity which attempts to exclude all non-procreative intimacy as " gross," " unlovely," or " merely physical," implies as premiss an attitude itself impure, because in conflict with itself. The other attitude—that sex is not only a means of race-perpetuation but also, like other sensuous capacities, a natural basis for communion, affection and enjoyment which civilisation can refine, enrich and conserve for, and in marriage and normal family life—this attitude, we claim, is essentially more honest and fearless, more in conformity with the facts, and essentially cleaner, than the assumption that sex is sin, or that physical pleasure *in se* tends to defile.

EVEN such a term as " prostitution," in its larger sense, describes a condition in which the attitudes of the participators toward the act are determining factors. If a wife *feels* like a prostitute and continues the behaviour which conditions this feeling, she *is* a prostitute, essentially ; but another wife in similar physical behaviour with an opposite attitude is not doing ethically the same acts. Prostitution is essentially the utilisation of one's endowments for ends *admittedly* sordid : the sordidness must be felt by the perpetrator. The existence of some narrowly or physically selfish " marriages " gave Dr. Kelly no right,

in the interest of propaganda, to insult decent and conscientious wives and mothers by attributing such feelings to them, nor spiritually to befoul women by introducing such disintegrating and undermining ideas into their minds either before or after marriage. The same principle applies, *a fortiori*, to other epithets of sin or guilt applied to non-procreative intercourse.

It should be further noted that, if the definition of prostitution above offered be sound, " prostitute wives " are by no means confined to those who practice contraception. Nor is it contraceptive practice *in se* that makes a couple sinful. It is rather the unethical yielding to what they consider a sordid temptation that makes them sinful.

It will be seen that the writer would admit, upon the above basis, that it is indeed sin for a good Catholic to use contraceptives ; not because contraception is *in se* wrong, but because yielding to a recognised " temptation " is wrong.

If Dr. Kelly's anathema implies that prostitution consists in the use of a person as a thing, it means also that all husbands who seek contraceptives are merely physically selfish, wishing to use a wife as a thing ; and that no women wish for birth control except as they are " corrupted " by the male. It seems no longer possible so to interpret the actual records of clinical experience. Husbands, like wives, often wish to protect health or progeny. Or, again, if Kelly defines the prostitute as one who enjoys physical sensuality regardless of personality (said to be a rare occurrence, by the way, among actual prostitutes), he implies unwarrantably that all wives and mothers who use contraceptives have such attitudes and appetites.

The " prostitute " epithets thus rest upon the same underlying assumptions previously expounded : that merely affectional conjugal union is wicked, that contraception precludes love and parenthood, or that lack of external deterrents implies unrestrained degradation. All these we deny. To admit that the impulses for pugnacity, fear, domination, or recognition require restraint is not to declare these impulses inherently wrong. It is relationships, social relations, and not impulses, that are wrong. A " morality " based merely upon external deterrents or fear of penalties does not deserve the name.

Contraceptives may indeed make possible purely self-regarding indulgences. Even here, the fundamental ethical objection lies against the self-regarding attitude in so far as it involves anti-social results, rather than against the opportunity for expressing such an attitude. This distinction is especially true if the opportunity is also capable of *non*-self-regarding uses. But the retaining in an act of intercourse of a procreative possibility does not, if there be no procreative or affectional will or purpose, make such act any less self-regarding. On the contrary, by involving worry or unwanted pregnancy and

unloved childhood, it may make affectional unions *seem* like self-regarding indulgence; and both become thus positively anti-social instead of (at worst) a loss of potential social energies. It should be obvious, however, that contraception does not necessarily mean mere self-regarding indulgence, any more than uncontrolled, involuntary families assure "æsthetically shared," "other-regarding," "race-creative" or "community-responsible" marital relations. Nor are the cultural correctives and sublimators of crude sensuality necessarily absent in the voluntary family. Procreation becomes on the contrary a human act and an ethical act, and more keenly appreciated because (in the phrase of Epictetus) "subject to the will." Voluntary parenthood is generally recognised as prevalent among the classes whom even the opposition admit are the best fitted for parenthood. The epithets directed against these excellent potential parents thus are interpretable as evidence of animus, based perhaps on "repressions" in the objectors.

"SEX necessity" has nothing to do with the case. Acceptance of contraception merely recognises that in marriage intercourse is normal. It is not thereby assumed to be indispensable to health, either after or before marriage. Marital abstinence does, to be sure, frequently involve nervous strain, which is often avoidable if contraception is accepted. But husbands in families which accept contraception can be as considerate and self-controlled as any others, when the wife is physically or emotionally indisposed.

LEAVING now the question of physical and affectional satisfactions, and turning to other alleged selfish motives, it is apparent that selfishness is a relative term: that when I seek my family's welfare I may be called selfish. And in a sense truly, since my conjugal and parental wishes are a very real part of me. But so are my impulses for race or community welfare. Yet the wish for family welfare is not anti-social, nor is even the desire for comfort necessarily anti-social.

THE proverbial belief in the "polygamous nature" of the male, like that in "sex necessity," has doubtless seemed to prove itself by serving as justification of attitudes and practices that became habitual and general. Accepting this for the nonce, is the man more apt, or less apt, to wax "polygamous," or rather, promiscuous, when husband and wife have abstained by mutual consent, as the only way known to them (or permitted by the code) to avoid wrecking her health or the welfare of her children? The alleged polygynous impulses may be greater in the type of man who resists images of his wife as a mother, but this resistant attitude is not necessarily involved in having a controlled family. Reverence of the wife may be actually increased if her assumption of motherhood be on each occasion a co-operative and voluntary consecration rather than a feared incident or accident. *Involuntary* "co-operation with the Creator" hardly deserves or dignifies the phrase.

ADVOCATES of " purity " who so sharply set off passion and love *in idea*, help to split them *in fact* in young readers, and by giving the impression that a man or woman who shows sex passion has not love or tarnishes true love thereby may do grave injustice, in particular or in general, to one sex or the other. If a proposal of family limitation by either party is further assumed to indicate such loveless passion, the chances for misunderstanding are increased. Says Cooper: " Sex passion in the man only too often masquerades in the domino of love. Women, particularly the unmarried, being as a more general rule less drawn by the grosser physical side of sex than by its higher psychic and emotional phases, often do not realise the absorbing and overpowering physical drive that sex so commonly exerts in the masculine life . . . and how easily the physical side of sex may eclipse and overshadow love." If this statement had been actually calculated to undermine the confidence upon which conjugal love rests, by introducing into the hearts of wives suspicions as to the motives and honour of husbands who propose family limitation, it could hardly be a more effective statement for the purpose.

BY another writer, birth control is accused of being merely a device of male domination. " Woman . . . must free herself from bondage to man's sensual demands." Is, then, man mere brute and woman purely mother, without interest in conjugal union other than procreation? If this be what is meant, the above quotation, from one who probably would not admit that she is a man-hater, implies either the naive assumption that where procreation is permitted, or occurs, man's " sensual demands " are *ipso facto* purified, or else that the mother may conceive only in the sin of the father. If the writer is any judge of feminist attitudes, it is a finer sex life, free from anxiety, rather than the elimination of intimacy, that most women seek. However this may be, the propaganda for recognition of birth control certainly does not oppose or prevent either voluntary maternity or voluntary continence for those who wish them.

THERE is, so far as known to the writer, no inductive comparison of the relative frequency of intercourse in birth-control families and non-birth-control families. If we recall (1) that Catholics and many others posit " marital rights," which are not called into action if both parties are agreed on intercourse or non-intercourse; (2) that Catholic instruction permits the couple to seek and use the supposedly " non-fertile periods "; and (3) that some people find (or at least behave on the assumption) that the more frequent the intercourse the less frequent the conceptions—it seems likely that absence of birth control does not lessen intercourse. Nor is it clear that a possible increase would be undesirable. In what Patten calls the " surplus economy " or " pleasure economy " of the present or future there need be less self-denial than in the ages in which our moral codes were crystallised.

Just what is excess in sex has never been defined; the writer suspects that the only satisfactory definition must be in terms of individuals and their social functions. Whatever absorbs energies which might be put to more permanently satisfactory uses may be said to be excessive. The use of contraceptives may permit temporary excess; it is doubtful whether it has caused an appreciable net increase of excesses; it certainly does not necessarily imply excess or lack of common-sense self-control.

THE freedom to control the family by other means, which Father Cooper apparently offers within the bounds of Catholic practice, may prove illusory. Catholics may refuse intercourse where there is serious reason: adultery, insanity, intoxication, grave contagion or grave illness, extraordinary suffering, peril in child-birth, &c. (Lack of love and lack of support are not here mentioned as serious reasons.) They may also abstain by mutual consent if moral and other danger is absent. They might thus jointly abstain because of economic or health reasons not grave enough to be ground for individual refusal, and because of their ignorance or fear of contraceptive practice; and through nervous irritability they might thus undermine their mutual affection. If such a possibility be recognised as a moral danger serving as a bar to mutual-consent abstinence, then the couple have only the alternative of further procreation until "grave" danger is reached.

THE clause "if . . . danger is absent" either makes the permission of mutual-consent abstinence meaningless, or it implies an admission that abstinence may involve dangers of incontinence or neurosis, and that parenthood involuntary for one at least of the parents may be preferable to the effects of reciprocal continence or to extra-marital incontinence. Now involuntary parenthood of this sort may not happen through "desire of the flesh" in the unwilling party, but neither does it arrive through procreative purpose. Intercourse for non-procreatie purposes is supposed, however, to be wrong, regardless of what that non-procreative purpose or lack of procreative purpose may be. The Catholic teaching then leads by implication to a strange but possible situation: Here is a couple, legally and sacramentally, man and wife. They are forbidden conjugal union except for reproduction, or at most are permitted only unions with no bar to reproduction. But each is bound (except for grave reasons) to yield to the demand of the other for intercourse. One of them, though dreading a child at the time, may from sense of duty thus commit a technical sin, and at the same time may be serving the technical sin of the other, who demanded the union on merely affectional-conjugal basis, or because of alleged intolerable nervous strain. It is for the Catholic casuist to reconcile such paradoxes.

THOMAS D. ELIOT.

COMMUNICATIONS.

A Theory of Murder.*

An important contribution, not only to the psychology of crime but to its sociology, comes from a Swedish jurist. His book contains analyses of the chain of circumstance and personality, of habit of thought and action, and of the final motive in three specific cases of crime culminating in murder. They are examples selected from a method of investigation which offers striking results, and reflects not merely on individual psychology, but on social life. This method represents the newer attitude to crime. While the letter of the law mainly hangs on a given incident or deed, the problem of motive, on the one hand, and of the character of the doer on the other, has long played some part in the interpretation of the law. In every case as it arose for trial, not only the facts, but even the moral circumstances of the deed were the subject of pleading and of investigation, often prolonged. But once the facts were proved, the decision followed and there was an end. The interest to the sociologist of the present book, however, lies in the fact that it pursues the investigation back to the time when the author of the crime was considered to be a (more or less) normal individual by his fellows, and looked upon himself as one among them. It was possible to carry out these investigations in prison sometimes long after the crime, as capital punishment is inoperative in Sweden.

The relation of such analysis to other forms of psychological investigation will be evident; nevertheless it differs from many extreme forms of psycho-analysis. The author endeavours to trace back from the crime to the prime factors in earlier life, not so much by means of separate incidents of child-hood, on the one hand, or to phenomena of the unconscious on the other—thus involving much "interpretation" of "symbols" on the part of the investigator, and a large margin of error, but bases his investigation on more solid data, namely, the essential habits, the ways of life and the conscious outlook of each criminal.

The author's main generalisation is thus summed up: briefly stated, it is that "the determining factor in all crime is *weakness*." He continues, "I mean by weakness a general unfitness or incapacity for satisfying the demands which life imposes upon one and all, irrespective of social environment and other external conditions . . . . ." The three forms which he believes this weakness takes in the three cases studied are (1) Self-Deception, (2) Anguished Fear, (3) Shamming.

The author claims to have adopted, from the beginnings of his investigations, a position "not merely very sceptical to his own generalisations but positively hostile." This self-criticism may well help to explain the force with which he brings his argument home, pruned, one feels of unproved hypotheses. This is also the foundation of the book's undoubted literary power. As the writer of the preface remarks, "the author is not only a pre-eminent criminal psychologist; his work is stamped with considerable literary talent. He draws his criminal types with artistic breadth and the reader follows his analysis of the course of action with something of the tenseness which he experiences in the study of a drama by a master hand."

* The Psychology of Murder. A Study in Criminal Psychology, by Andreas Bjerre, Doctor of Laws. Translated from the Swedish by E. Classen, M.A. Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd. 1927. (9s. net.)

THE picture he draws, not only of the particular delinquency and crime under observation, but of the unsatisfactory social state which has allowed of this is sufficiently appalling. One sees in each environment portrayed, the faults now of the urban, now of the rural milieu to which the criminal belonged. The complexity of modern town life forbids discussion in a brief review. The relative simplicity of rural life, the contrast of its present individualistic bias to the old community life and community spirit, at its best, forces one to comparisons of the present with the past. How did the wiser members of the community—parents, elders, and leaders, temporal and spiritual—combine to meet the disintegrative elements present among them, whether their origin came from within or from without the circle of their present life? Their awareness to the health or ill-health of the spirit of work and of human relations, to courage and peace of mind, was personified from primitive times by the household spirits and work spirits which peopled home, dairy, and field. Many writers have shown this, among them Dr. Arthur J. Brock, pointing comparisons of brownies, elves or kelpies, with the personifications, usually of tragic form, in the cases of " war shock," so frequent during the war and after it but so deeply connected with unsatisfactory response to life in peace-time. These were in fact but exaggerated cases of *peace shock*, of which modern " society " takes but too little cognisance and can still less offer a remedy. It has, however, been too little noticed, too little understood even by many able and sympathetic students, how much peasant folk throughout Europe came with Christianity (perhaps even with earlier beginnings), not merely to conceive of the spirit of their work and daily life as familiar " sprites " to be suffered or cajoled, but as a spirit which, by constant, reverent and loving care and dedication, could be kept alive, sane and strong within them. Fortunately, where the folk-lorist, anthropologist and psychologist have too often failed, a musician or poet has sometimes stepped in. Folk-songs from many lands, from Eastern Europe to the Hebrides, number among them the labour songs, the runes, the hymns of home which consecrated every act of daily life, every duty of household and of farm. In old days the people were manifestly aware of the moral issues of work in daily life and grasped them firmly in their hands, just as at the close of day they knew the need of consecrating sleep, the rhythm of repose.

WHAT lessons can one find from the author's portrayal of this nightmare of anti-social lives that, almost inevitably, drifted into collision and the deaths of others, lessons for that social life which shall bring harmonious strength to each one of its members? Self-deception, anguished fear and sham can only be replaced by their opposites—frankness to oneself, courage and self-reliance, and frankness to one's neighbours, as to oneself. " Know thyself," " to thine own self be true "—these are the first lesson. How closely interwoven this is with the last the writer proves; in fact, how deeply social is the execution of that first commandment of the solitary, the philosopher and the hermit, " Know thyself." And courage, and self-reliance are built up by a mutual co-operation, and by expectation of normal success that this helps so largely to build up. For mutual confidence is after all a main spring of self-confidence and self-reliance, in all but the most combative and self-assertive natures. The problem suggested by this book is how once again to build up a rural community life, and how to build in new ways a life which shall embrace the activities of urban life, uniting them into a truly civic whole in which each citizen, no longer a mere competitive individual, may play a manly part.

ARTHUR GEDDES.

WELLS AND "THE WORLD OF WILLIAM CLISSOLD."

IN the interval that has elapsed since the publication of the WORLD OF WILLIAM CLISSOLD, it is probable that the book has been read by nearly every one who so intended. This is not, therefore, the place to describe the structure of the work, nor to re-open the much discussed question whether "Clissold" is to be regarded or not as the mouthpiece of the author. It will suffice to say that for many readers this figure, at once engaging and repellant, with his life-history of scientific research harnessed to business ends while diversified by romantic episodes, placed in late middle age on a mountain height to think out and to enunciate a world project of consolidation and reform in human activity, is possessed, as always his creator, of a power of compelling attention, so that the utterances, almost against the will, invade and dominate our thoughts as might those of an old-time prophet.

IT is intended here merely to single out for emphasis or for criticism certain aspects of the project for reconstruction of human affairs outlined in the book, while it may incidentally be possible to indicate the value of the contribution indubitably made therein to sociological theory.

THE genius of H. G. Wells has provided his contemporaries with a number of studies of possible metamorphoses or reconstructions, as the case may be, of human life on this planet. A veritable phantasmagoria, it would seem, has passed before us since the rider on the Time Machine beheld in an incredibly remote future the leisured classes and the workers of modern civilisation at last overtaken by differing but equally ghastly forms of atrophy. One recalls that frightful accentuation of the strident mechanical efficiency of our urban life as it met the gaze of the Sleeper awakened: that contrasting picture of the cheerful re-ordering of life and jettison of its rubbish on the morning when men woke with perceptions clarified and obsessions removed by the beneficent impact of the Comet on the earth's atmosphere; or again various nightmare visions of the results of unlocking the forces of science by beings either powerless to control them or impelled to direct them to ends of destruction. Always there has been an insistence on the capacity for modification, presumably inherent in human nature, linked closely with all changes in the means available for carrying on life; always there is the suggestion that while there is the possibility of progress there is also the risk of decadence or even extinction.

LATTERLY the glimpses given, for example, in the Dream as also in a measure in the earlier part of Men Like Gods, are of a race not removed by æons of time, nor by startling changes in material conditions, which has in some way won through to a freedom, a poise, a serenity, and above all to a power of creative work and of enjoyment of work in common amid beautiful, or at least well-ordered, surroundings, such as we ourselves experience at rare intervals, know to be the best life gives, and are poignantly aware cannot be realised, as the world is now, by more than some small fraction of any organised society.

THE WORLD OF WILLIAM CLISSOLD is avowedly an attempt, as was in a measure its prototype, NEW LAMPS FOR OLD, to describe the metamorphosis which has actually come about in human society and relationships within the last sixty or seventy years, and to outline a project "to make the apprehension of this metamorphosis fundamental and directive in human affairs .... to harmonise people's lives with it and to undermine and remove the resistances that may divert its forces towards destruction." Should

such a harmony be achieved, it is inferred, and indeed explicitly indicated, that some such general gracious flexible ordering of life and work, as is glimpsed above, may be anticipated: if not, then human hopes may be gradually stifled in the jungle of cross-purposes and counter-claims to which modern life is even now approximating.

THE metamorphosis itself is, Clissold says, already a fact known to any well-read, well-educated person. The description, somewhat reiterated, of the change in mental attitudes, associated with the mechanical changes of the period, is of interest chiefly as synthetising a fairly general experience: the gradual refusal to regard what is established as necessarily of permanent meaning and value, the desire to replace forms of parade or social routine by creative effort in common, the substitution of international sympathies and activities for the exclusively national, and so on. To this mental attitude is given the name of the "adult phase" of the human cycle. This phrase may be useful as a label, but cannot be taken too literally, since it is conceivable that changes *might* occur which would make even a Clissold mentally appear juvenile. Incidentally, it may be remarked that a constitutional dislike of "crowds," shared by many of us, need not prevent the recognition of the value of the exhilaration that comes from being a sharer in the spontaneous emotion of a "transient group." This is quite as important a factor in human nature as a sense of beauty.

THE actually youthful in years (*i.e.*, those between adolescence and the age of 30) are not credited by Clissold with having achieved this "adult" phase, but are instead characterised as still "barbaric" or at best "mediæval" in outlook. It is of course arguable that the young must recapitulate the mental phases of the past, that there must be phylogenetic inheritance, in fact. Even so, such recapitulation might be complete within a much reduced time and with the present social inheritance, one would presume that the young, in this sense, might quite rapidly develop the mental characteristics of the period to which they in fact belong in a somewhat more precise sense than do the sexagenarians. Is it possible that the view expressed is nothing more than the typical uncorrected sexagenarian view of youth? Only the young can truly know the young, but to many observers themselves of the elder generation the characteristics of present day youth include a high degree of creative and critical power conjoined, a balance, quickness of perception and width of sympathies, all in a measure surpassing the endowment of their compeers of a generation earlier. If, indeed, stress is to be laid on "release from concentration on personal ends" as claimed by the "fully adult" Clissold, it is undeniable that, in the limiting sense at least, this cannot be predicted of youth, for to youth the whole world readily becomes an extension of its own overflowing personality. It is this fact which renders the whole-hearted co-operation of youth essential to any progressive work, planned as it may be by the elder generation. Clissold would have been wiser to admit this more generously.

IF examined closely this indictment of youth is seen to be a preliminary to a criticism of existing education, both school and University, a criticism, be it noted, confined almost entirely, and in the discussion of a world project strangely, to England. The frank caricature of a schoolmaster is so entwined with the fictional life-history of Clissold, that it may perhaps be disregarded here. On the other hand, the tribute paid to the progressive school in touch with the realities of the life of the community loses value from a curious failure to recognise that education on such lines is, and has for some time past been gaining ground in England, and was not merely a fugitive gleam

quenched finally by the death of Sanderson of Oundle. Ideas of this order are seldom, if ever, the product of one mind only, seldom so linked with the personal life as to perish with their exponents. The change that has come over school education in England within the last twenty years, a change of which Clissold seems only very partially aware, has been the work of many minds, and the ideal in view has consistently been that very adaptation to the ever developing demands of life of which he emphasises the need. Again, though some part of his criticism of the older universities is undoubtedly justified, the lines which he lays down for "the new institutions for the increase of knowledge" seem strangely to resemble those already followed by universities of the modern type to be found throughout Europe, in America and even in Great Britain. The linkage of the scientific research and teaching with industry, an international exchange of the results of such research, these are present day realities of university work, and indeed by this avenue one approach might seem already to be made to that realisation of the World Republic which is the fundamental theme of this book.

NEGATIVELY defined, the attainment of the World Republic implies "the release of man from traditions, economic usages, social injustices, encumbering institutions . . . . that dwarf, confuse and cripple his life upon this planet; that divide it, impoverish it, keep it in a continual danger from the wasting fever of war and threaten him with extinction." Viewed positively, it is perhaps most readily comprehended as the anticipated outcome of the work of a World Directorate itself to arise from the "deliberate invitation, explicit discussion and co-operation of the men most interested in economic organisation, men chosen by their work . . . . and working with the support of an increasing general understanding." The beginnings of such a regime is not to be sought in any vague cosmopolitanism; rather, these directive forces already take definite form as world-steel, world-shipping, world-cotton, world-food. The new order of things "will have incorporated all the mineralogical and chemical industries, agricultural production and distribution, the transport organisations of the world . . . . power production and distribution, ... into one interlocking system. It will not be a world empire . . . . but a world business organisation." And just as the great modern business houses have become "almost in spite of themselves, founders of technical schools, library and theatre proprietors, builders of industrial suburbs, ... keepers of their workers' health," so the world organisation will direct the education and biological life of the world community.

THE whole of this far-reaching project is to come about, according to its exponent apart from officialism, apart from the intervention of existing governments. If Clissold's distrust of the official or State element did not approximate to a phobia, he might have noted that scientific organisation of a community by a government is being tried out, not without success, in modern Italy. No one, however, is likely to dispute his assertion that world power and the future lie with the enlightened trader and financier.

CLISSOLD has a poor opinion of congresses and conferences, but assuredly none of the concrete world activities he outlines could be undertaken except after the international expert discussion which is so familiar a feature of our times. Nor is it likely that such discussions can have an immediately constructive outcome. For example, a meeting representative of the co-operative wheat marketing agencies of Canada, Australia, the United States, and of the Wheat Export Corporation of Soviet Russia may take place, as it did in May of this year at Kansas City, and the question of forming a

world-wide organisation to control wheat supply and prices may be brought up, but all that immediately results is the appointment of a Committee to investigate ways and means of effecting co-operation between national wheat pooling organisations, World statistics of production, of movement are the first requisite. The World Agricultural Census, arranged by the Rockefeller Trust for 1930, and now under organisation from the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome, should supply such basic statistics. There may be false starts in the advance towards international action, but advance there is. In every important country there now exists similar departmental machinery under expert control for improving and safeguarding agricultural production: agricultural experiment stations, plant protection services equipped with entomological and mycological laboratories, forestry institutes, irrigation and land reclamation services, regulations for herd improvement, for control of anthrax, organised by interchange of results already into a kind of World Directorate for this group of ends.

To return to the world project of the book, two activities subsidiary to the new order are indicated, a regenerate world press and an international police. It has often been remarked that there is nothing in the theory of the police institution to prevent internationalisation at any time. The power of the distributing businesses over the press is also an admitted fact, and Clissold thus easily links the regeneration of the newspaper with the establishment of the enlightened world business organisation. If this should come to pass, an incubus would indeed be lifted from human life.

THE kernel of the whole conception lies in the presumed development of the "fully adult" life among an increasing number of persons, that is, of a gradual identification of their interests with those of the progress of the race, a discarding of any habitual self-regard or accentuation of personal concerns, any servitude to instinctive motives. We have come of late to distrust our powers of such putting away of childish things—we recognise that primitive man virtually survives in every individual, and that the infant mentality is constantly reasserting itself and determining our actions. This is not to deny the possibility of advance, nor to belittle the achievements of the ego-ideal, merely to emphasise the precarious nature of the process. One can only envy Clissold his sense of certainty of attainment, or are we to suppose that his creator does not take him quite seriously at this point?

AGAIN the problems of the relation of the individual to the group are still obscure. Any assumption of a group mind may be dismissed as almost certainly fallacious, the phrase is not one employed by Clissold. A group ideal there may be, by surrender of the ego-ideal of each member and substitution of that of the dominant factor in the group, but the achievement of this for a group embracing the whole world, or even for the enlightened members of the human race as yet passes the imagination, even though informed with the spectacle of the dominance of a group ideal in modern Italy.

AND yet, writing here in the native town of Angelo Poliziano, the friend of Lorenzo il Magnifico and tutor of his children, and one of the greatest exponents of Greek humanism and liberal culture in Italy,—seeing at every turn, alike in gracious building and planning and in that acceptance and appreciation of beauty, that courtesy too which seem the birthright of every Italian, the enduring influence of that flowering and release of the spirit that came about among those groups of friends in Tuscany 500 years ago—remembering, too, what Italy has ever since meant for Europe—it is impossible not to feel that the commonwealth of ideas has reality. What was

effected then, before the day of science and amid hampering traditions, by the co-operation of enlightened minds, it seems may after all be effected again, in these days of ever widening horizons, for more comprehensive ends.

CAROLINE HUBBACK.

EDITORIAL NOTE.

IT is the strength of Wells that his work is essentially one whether it be his novels or his Utopias. Clear vision of Utopia must spring from an insight into life as it is; to see the world becoming what we would, we must see it in its being. Mr. Wells commands our attention because as a novelist, he sees the England about him, and from this he imagines and vividly presents the picture of a future England, his Utopia. In his novels there is a sense of life struggling to realisation,—of young souls struggling to self expression, of older ones struggling with those about them, of their matings, more or less well matched, their thoughts, and the impact and ricochet of their meetings and relations. And at the same time the novelist has shown, as in "Mr. Britling," the relations of their little world to England, and of England to a larger world outside. From this combination of a searching gaze focussed on individual lives and of a larger outlook on English and international affairs, Mr. Wells re-presents his vision of the future, and it commands our respect. At the same time, it leaves us cold.

FOR in all the work of Wells one is left with the feeling of incompleteness: we can recall there no picture of an intimate, joyous family, united by their love and by that love uniting themselves and one another to other families, to other men and women, young and old. We can recall no image of one fully human character, combining the main great joys of life "the essential functions of the adult," namely, the fulfilment of the great human relations through the course of his life. Even in the stories of the evolution of individual personalities, we do not feel a son growing up in brotherhood to become a father in his time, still less to be a father even worthier than his own, as a Utopian should! There is no portrait of the citizen, child of his city, rising in maturity to something of civic fatherhood. There is no image of the lover fully husband and co-parent with his mate, co-citizen in this larger sense. And what is true of the author's men is no less true of his women.

CONTINUING, as we emerge to the larger world, the realisation is lacking of the joy and satisfaction of labour. And with it we lose the greatest joy of comradeship, greatest and most enduring when it is won through work. Indeed, fellowship is wanting among Wells' characters whether at work or play. Not only the pleasure in "a transient group" is wanting, for this is not enough. "Transience" is the experience of student days, when the youth, breaking from his books, rushes out for a "sing-song" or an innocent "rag" before going back to his solitary studies. The author, become an older "student," often loses even this in his years of lonely labour. Yet no first-rate workman, even to-day, is without the experience of comradeship in his work. Without joy in labour, joy in comradeship, Utopia were a poor place indeed!

FINALLY, when we turn to Wells' presentment of international affairs, the new business world he tells of is one of world organisation, informed, efficient, but cold. Yet if it be cold, how can the altruistic service the author would have as its motive ever be realised? Is it not for lack of comradeship, in strenuous labour and in still more strenuous thought, that the men who make the trusts and combines of to-day serve the "Mammon of unrighteousness," not the passion for a newer world, Moloch and not Peace?

THUS, as it seems to us, the novels of Wells tell of passions warped or unbridled, of matings that never attain to fullest parenthood and citizenship because they are unrelated to a doctrine of conduct and a full cycle of career. On the other hand, their thought, fine as it is, remains too cold, too sterile also, because it is unrelated to the life of heart and hand. Hence in his Utopias of passionless, mechanically connected projects and activities, we seek in vain the fundamental and the ideal of Utopia, that of the unity of passion and control and might,—of heart, of head and hand. As Wells the Novelist sees in those about him disunited faculties and aims, so Wells the Utopian fails in the vision of these healed and harmonised as one. The clue is still to find.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: by E. Roy Calvert. London and New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. (5s. net.)

THIS is a very satisfying book. At least, that is the first adjective for it that occurred to the present reviewer. The author, who is the Secretary of the National Council for the Abolition of the Death Penalty (23 Charing Cross, S.W.1), marshals the arguments of the supporters of the death penalty for murder one by one and demolishes them in turn, so that, as far as intellectual argument goes, they seem to be left without a leg to stand on. But, as Mr. Calvert recognises, opinion on the subject is very much a matter of intuitive conviction. There are two questions at the bottom of this controversy: (1) Is it ever right to kill a human being? (2) What is the best way to protect society from murder?

THERE is a third question which perhaps undercuts both the above: What principle or attitude should dictate our dealings with our fellow men, including murderers? To some the answer is indicated by such sayings as "Judge not," "Resist not evil," "Overcome evil with good," "Love one another." Hard sayings, no doubt, and seemingly beyond the reach of most of us; yet their practical outcome would seem to be that our duty, individual and collective, to the murderer, as to any other delinquent, is to try to understand him and do the best possible for his lasting good, which will be also the best possible for society's good—and, in any case, that life is too sacred for it to be right to kill him. The author states his own view in one sentence in his preface (italics his own): "My objection to the Death Penalty is based upon the conviction that it is both *futile* and *immoral*, and that the interests of the community would be *best* served by its abolition."

SEARCHING for something to criticise, one comes on this sentence on p. 180. "Capital Punishment is based upon the assumption that the murderer is beyond the reach of spiritual reclamation and is unfit to live." It may be so with some people. But others will readily allow that a murderer may be, and sometimes is, spiritually reclaimed, and yet that justice requires his death. Perhaps a future edition (of which may there be many) will modify this passage in recognition of that fact.

TALKING of future editions, another curious error requires correction. On pp. 30 (footnote), 32, 34 and 202, the name Sir John Macdonald occurs, where evidently Sir John Macdonell is meant.

USEFUL features are a summary of the argument at the end of each chapter, and a short bibliography at the end of the book, which latter might perhaps have included the publications of the old Society for the Abolition of Capital Punishment and more of the publications of the Howard League and its parent societies.

THE following refreshing quotation from so eminent a jurist as Lord Buckmaster in the Introduction is not to be resisted: "The whole subject of which Capital Punishment is simply a part has to be carefully studied. It is assumed that society has the right to punish as it pleases all offenders against its laws. The rule which should guide us, however, is not that of doing what the law says we have power to do but what reason, justice and humanity say we ought to do, and these forbid the continuance of Capital Punishment."

A VERY excellent book. May it meet with the success which it and its indefatigable author deserve.

A. ST. J.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: an Introduction by Professor L. L. Bernard. Cornell University (Henry Holt & Co., New York. Large 8vo, 650 pp. 84.50.)

THIS is a ponderous book in every sense of the word—a "text-book" for the specific purpose of turning out other sociologists. The author is careful to show how it will fit in with this or that undergraduate course, along with other weighty text-books, which dart from other "viewpoints." He allows that, for "a brief course," his 600 odd pages may suffice, even if the student is not eager to explore the thousands of references to magazine articles, which fill pages 591 to 636. But the student who treats his work seriously, must not only master this volume; the writer has another in reserve, and meanwhile he gives references, which will keep his readers busy for a year or two anyway.

NOW is all this elaboration to be classed as pedantry or sound learning? Must the student "get up" an elaborate psychology, an elaborate social psychology (half of which repeats what he has learned in psychology), and continue the process with sociology, politics, education, each of which comprehensively goes over the aspect, bases, phases, viewpoints of the earlier studies? I have a suspicion that American students do *not* wade through all this mass; a few, destined to become professors and produce more text-books may do so, but the great bulk of them will be content with a glib smattering of "talk round" the topics, and will graduate with a comfortable sense that they are masters of mind and matter.

I HOPE this treatment of a distinguished teacher will not be regarded as flippant. The book is a sound, highly organised critical study of behaviour, and for men who have made some acquaintance with neurology, the study here presented will lead to a clear conception of the relations of a man to his social environment. The author's earlier work on INSTINCT is summarised in Chapters IX. and X. This portion of the book by itself shows how greatly Professor Bernard's criticism is needed in order to correct the bias in popular sociology established by McDougall's influence since the appearance of the latter's SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY in 1908. In this volume he carries his criticism further, analysing the mechanism of imitation and of suggestion, refusing to treat their concepts as instincts or causes of behaviour, but emphasising the role of each "as a method of response." At the close he dwells again on the problem which has evidently been much on his mind, viz., the classification of social sciences and the justification for giving social psychology a distinct field and function. "The Problem of Social Psychology is as distinct as that of any other Social Science. It is to find out how men behave in groups, or, in other words, to study the reaction of individuals to the psycho-physical environment and the consequent building up of collective adjustment behaviour patterns in the individual in response to social stimuli. In order to answer their question it is necessary, on the one hand, for the Science of Social Psychology to have an analysis of the Psycho-social environment in terms of the processes operating to provide stimuli to the responding individual, and on the other hand to understand the organisation of behaviour patterns to the individual himself." This quotation shows the ground which this volume covers, and the pedestrian style, with which the author shackles himself. There is a wealth of good material embedded here, but it has to be dug out with patience.

J. J. FINDLAY.

DANSES ET LÉGENDES DE LA CHINE ANCIENNE, par MARCEL GRANET. 2 vols. (Travaux de l'Année Sociologique publies sous la Direction de M. Marcel Mauss.) Paris : Alcan.

HITHERTO the sociologist has taken little part in the study of ancient Chinese culture. It is certainly not for lack of material, for there is no other civilisation in the world, not even our own, which has so intense an interest in its past, and has had so keen a sense of the value of documentary evidence. It is, perhaps, rather that the work of Chinese scholarship is so massive and so complete that it has left no free ground on which the foreign investigator can stake out his claim. Hence the quandary in which the Western student finds himself. Either he must accept *en bloc* without criticism the results of the native historians, or he must resign himself to the most absolute agnosticism regarding the whole early development of Chinese civilisation. And this explains the peculiar character of Western Sinology. European scholars in dealing with other oriental societies—with India or Islam—have created independent historical works which throw a new light on the past. In China, on the other hand, from the days of De Mailla to those of M. Cordier, they have contented themselves with translations and compilations from the native historians, and their only original work has been devoted to the elucidation of Chinese relations with the European peoples or with other parts of Asia. It is only in our own days that the attempt has been made by a few pioneers working independently in different countries to pierce through the hitherto impenetrable veil of the Confucian tradition, and to reconstitute the history of the origins of Chinese culture on a new and independent basis.

AMONG these attempts one of the most interesting, and certainly the most daring and revolutionary, is that of M. Marcel Granet in a series of works, one of the most important of which has recently appeared. M. Granet is the pupil both of M. Chavannes and of M. Durkheim, and his work can only be adequately appreciated or criticised by those who, like himself, are at the same time sociologists and Chinese scholars. It would, however, be a great misfortune if the students of his work were confined to this possible non-existent body or even to the very limited class of professed Sinologists, for it is one of the most brilliant and original essays in the sociological interpretation of history that has appeared in recent years.

IN his earlier work " Fêtes et Chansons Anciennes de la Chine," which appeared in 1919, M. Granet aims at the reconstruction of the primitive peasant society which lies at the root of Chinese social development. The present volumes : " Danses et Légendes de la Chine Ancienne " (1926, 2 vols.), which have been published under the auspices of L'Année Sociologique, do the same for the ancient feudal society out of which the classical civilisation of the Confucian age arose.

FOR behind this classical culture with its elaborate ideals of moral order and social etiquettes which have inspired the whole literary tradition of China, there lies the relics of an older civilisation " assuredly more barbarous, but also richer in myths, in legends, in ideas, in creative forces, and in individual energies." The " rationalist fideism " of the Chinese scholars has succeeded in eliminating, by an age-long process of expurgation, everything in the literary tradition which was opposed to the mature ideals of Confucian thought, and has thus projected into the past the ideas and controversies of the rival schools of the post-feudal epoch. It is only by a patient and detailed analysis of the rites and ceremonies preserved by Chinese tradition, and the

reinterpretation of history in the light of their evidence, that it is possible to recover the vestiges of this vanished stage of society. There are indeed two distinct strata of social phenomena hidden under the superficial uniformity of the historical tradition. On the one hand there is the Peasant Culture, based on the large undivided family with matrilinear descent, and centring in the cult of the Earth Mother and the annual ceremonies of the Vegetarian Religion conducted at the rural Holy Place. On the other there is the urban aristocratic society, with patriarchal institutions and an official religion which centred in the worship of Heaven, and in the periodical regulation of the Calendar by the Chief on which the whole course of nature was believed to depend.

It is impossible within the limit of these few pages to describe even in the most summary way the extraordinary rich and subtle analysis to which M. Granet submits the fragmentary and elusive data preserved by the orthodox literary tradition. As we have said before, the detailed criticism of his methods and conclusions must be left to the specialists, though even a member of the general public will be fascinated by the ingenuity with which he elicits the most surprising results from the most unpromising materials. Those who wish to form some idea of his general conclusions should turn to his little book on "The Religion of the Chinese" in the series "Science et Civilisation" (1922), which, in spite of its brevity, forms an admirable introduction to the study of Chinese culture. Moreover, it completes his larger works by tracing the later developments of religion in China, and, above all, by showing how the classical Confucian civilisation arose out of the earlier phase of culture.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

THE WORKER IN MODERN ECONOMIC SOCIETY: by Paul H. Douglas, Curtice N. Hitchcock and Willard E. Atkins. University of Chicago Press. 1923. $4.50.

This work is somewhat difficult to appraise, its value as an exercise to the writers being in our opinion considerably above its usefulness to the students for whom it is intended. It consists in a comprehensive survey of industry and industrial questions, compiled from extracts from the writings of economists, historians, psychologists, and others, classified under well-arranged headings, each chapter concluding with a series of such questions and problems as might be set to a class or seminar.

As a piece of mental gymnastic the work is beyond praise; to have collected and arranged the extracts and to have thought out the ensuing problems and questions must have given the compilers themselves a considerable mastery of, and a wide outlook over, the subject. It is its value as a textbook that we doubt. Extracts from so many writers are more likely to confuse than help the student; will the innocent and inexperienced (even with the aid of the footnotes thoughtfully provided) always distinguish what was said by, *e.g.*, F. W. Taylor, from the remarks of Mr. G. D. H. Cole, will he always be able mentally to separate the historic values of Professor Knowles from those of Professor Unwin? Surely fewer authors, read consecutively and with some elucidatory study of their backgrounds and point of view, would afford better food and exercise for the mind than a mass of brief selections torn from their context, such as we have here.

B. L. H.

LORD SHAFTESBURY AND SOCIAL-INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS: by J. Wesley Bready, M.A., B.D. George Allen and Unwin. 1926. pp. 446. (16s. net.)

THIS very readable book by a Canadian evangelist on a familiar theme should interest readers of the SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW from several angles. Chief among these is the fact that the author can do what they cannot do. He can repeat the slogans and controversial phrases, the crude hopes expectations, dreams and visions of nearly a hundred years ago, with all the freshness of the originals. The baffling kaleidoscope of the social process or processes has rearranged the pieces and colours a score of times since young Lord Ashley heard the call to his crusade in the year of Waterloo. Sociologists seek almost in vain to know why it is only the unexpected which happens, and like Penelope at her loom unravel again and again their theories of social causation and begin again. Not so, Mr. Bready. A preacher with audiences to stir, a warm heart and a robust faith, he is sure that the evangelical movement which an earlier John Wesley started, is the efficient cause of our social progress, equally sure that the Oxford Movement was a stumbling block and rock of offence, and the secularists another. He has no hesitation in showering opprobrious epithets at all the Earl's opponents. We are shown here in a most instructive way the difference between the value of a word or phrase in an harangue and its currency in a history or a treatise. The orator puts his opponents in the wrong by a string of highly-coloured suggestions or innuendoes. The audience carried away by the living enthusiasm of the speaker, his flashing eyes and excited tones, are cajoled by a manœuvre which looks absurd on a page of print. Mr. Bready preaches to us all through, and preaches extremely well. He analyses nothing and fails to make any appeal to our analytical faculties or sympathies. If the reader has any friends who do not know about the factory acts, coal-mine regulations acts, lunacy acts, and the elementary education movement in the 19th century, he can refer them here to a spirited fair-minded volume calculated to arouse their interest in these matters. It is in no sense a handbook or a textbook. Dates and particulars must be sought elsewhere. Here we have eloquence, enthusiasm and invective.

WE shall probably mostly agree that had we lived in Lord Shaftesbury's time we should have backed or liked to back most of his agitations. We know that the future is always very dark, and we do not pretend that we should have seen any further into it than he did. We do know, however, that the evils he saw were neither just what he saw, nor so susceptible of the remedies he applied as he imagined. We cannot elude the knowledge that when many of his remedies have been applied on a scale he never dreamed of, the evils have shown a capacity to survive which would have staggered him, and which ought to shake the confidence of Mr. Bready more than they do. Lord Shaftesbury was a wholehearted supporter of the Ragged School movement and a supporter with reservations of the Education Act of 1870. If we followed Mr. Bready all the way we should be bound to conclude from the great developments both these movements have seen since that child neglect must have long disappeared from our midst. Yet we find our leading children's court magistrate in London using language about child neglect to-day as strong as Shaftesbury was using in the "forties," and basing it upon knowledge greater than the Earl ever had, and far greater than Mr. Bready's. The wellbeing of the child and the efficient functioning of parenthood are both mysteries extending beyond the ken of all of us, but not even envisaged by writers like Mr. Bready, for all his fine vigour and

sympathy. The recent Scottish report on Poverty, Nutrition and Growth has brought this forcibly home to us. Agitations may do good. Probably they do. They also mislead many, and they leave a legacy of crude blunders hard to rectify. It is very human to be swept along by the fire and fury of an agitation. It is far more moving than the patient analysis of the problem. We give our great agitators their mead of praise but we cannot canonise them. Not that Shaftesbury was the typical partisan agitator. Had he been so he would never have waived his opposition to the secularising tendencies of the Education Act of 1870. To sociologists the question arises, "Was he any more right in waiving that opposition than in using highly coloured material in some other agitations?" It is not too much to say that all Shaftesbury's presuppositions are now called in question, and almost all his legislation is in process of drastic overhauling. There remains the grand altruistic figure, the man of high serious purpose, the indefatigable toiler. If he blundered, much more likely are we to blunder unless we study constantly the pages of the SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW and imbibe its patient scientific reverent spirit.

WE have left to the last the one great blot upon a fine book. It was excusable in Shaftesbury to be misled, by his party and circle, about the difficult question of the import of opium into China. He was so misled and lent the weight of his name and influence to the perpetuation of a dastardly libel upon his country and countrymen. There is no excuse whatever for repeating the libel, as Mr. Bready does, in 1926. The whole question has been exhaustively treated in an American publication with, certainly, no bias in favour of England, THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE, by Hosea Ballou Morse (Vol. I.). This work is authoritative and readily available to Mr. Bready. Its perusal reveals the fact that everything the Earl believed and Mr. Bready repeats on this subject is in grotesque contradiction of the truth. England and the English, by the testimony of those who bear them no love, come out of the Chinese opium question without a stain on their character.

J. C. P.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AND EAST. "Economic Development": by Prof. Benoy Kumar Sarkar. B. G. Paul & Co., Madras. (Rs. 8/-)

THIS book is of interest to us Westerners on its own merits of extensive knowledge of us, as well as for its presentment of Indian outlooks beyond those commonly current. For instead of abstract politics we have here concrete economics, and seen as fundamental to politics, largely of a new kind. To the general student of economics his treatment should be suggestive; indeed, at its best it is exemplary.

PROF. SARKAR has for many years been studying one European country after the other, and from many viewpoints; so his book is a result not only of reading, but of wide personal intercourse and travel, and full of economic information and social reflection from all these sources. With all his descriptive concreteness, there are also large and bold generalisations, and frequent passages of social criticism and interpretation; and these ranging over France and Germany, from America to Japan, and of course from India to Britain, and home again; in fact, leading up to a broad sketch of an economic policy, very comprehensive, for young India. Alike as widely informative, and as actively stimulating, this book will be found well worth looking through and thinking over, both in East and West.

P. G.

THE COUNTRYMAN: A Quarterly Review and Miscellany of Rural Life and Progress. Edited and published by J. W. Robertson Scott at Idbury, Kingham, Oxford. No. 1: May, 1927.

HERE is a new contemporary deserving peculiarly cordial welcome from the SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, with its frequent insistance on need of the rural viewpoint to explain not only social origins, but contemporary evolution, which has been so long away from this, yet is now needing return thither.

So let THE COUNTRYMAN speak for himself:—

"WE have first-rate periodicals dealing with the cultivation of the land and the care of stock. What there is room for, and what is badly needed, is a periodical concerned with the welfare of the men and women who live on the land, and *their* cultivation. Without such a periodical everyone of us, working for the Rural Improvement on which a hopeful development of Civilisation so largely depends, feels that he or she is short of information and experience.

"Do you wish to reach some finality, or at any rate facts, concerning the major problems of the Agricultural Industry? Are you concerned about Cottages or Education? Do you want to be more useful on your County or District Council, or on your Board of Guardians, or as a Magistrate, a School Manager, or a member of your Rural Community Council? Are you a Schoolmaster or Schoolmistress, a Clergyman or a Minister, working in isolation? Are you an M.P., or even Bishop, or a Journalist, inclined to get a better grasp of rural questions? Have you discovered what good work can be done by developing the talent of so many rural folk for Acting, for Folk-Song and Dance, or for Handicrafts, and seek guidance? Are you interested, not only in what the Women's Institute Movement is doing, but in where it is going? Have you the problem of a Village Club or Hall? Do you wish to co-operate in the Preservation of your Countryside's Natural Beauty in old houses and wild creatures? Do you—— but it is unnecessary to go on. Briefly, in the rural sphere of work in which you are interested, you are, as often as not, at a loss. You feel that you do not know enough about rural achievement and rural thought outside your own community; are out of touch with kindred spirits. Your powers of service are checked. The hope for our countryside is that it is not short of countrymen and countrywomen of good will, energy, and capacity for service. The problem is to make their efforts more fruitful.

"THE object of THE COUNTRYMAN is therefore:—

1. To provide brisk, cogent, timely, authoritative articles.

2. To furnish a skilful, appetising digest and miscellany of that practical information in every department of Rural Welfare which steadily increases in Books, Reports, Press, &c., and now goes to waste.

3. To present, in an interesting, stirring way, the constructive thought of fertile and penetrating rural minds in this and other countries.

4. To be, in every possible way—in more ways than we have yet thought of—a help and a stimulus to men and women striving for better conditions of Rural Life, and to be a meeting ground for candid discussion.

5. To place before Town and City dwellers, vividly and convincingly, an intelligent view of the larger questions of Agriculture and of Rural Life in which, happily, they are increasingly interested.

"THE COUNTRYMAN is not the hanger-on of a Party, not the possession of a commercial firm. It is absolutely independent. The Editor is also Proprietor, and is answerable to no one but himself and his wife, for this is a Review equally for women and for men. THE COUNTRYMAN is non-Party and non-Sectarian—a platform for every honest view. In order that THE COUNTRYMAN shall be in the closest possible touch with the problems which engage the attention of its readers, it is edited not in London, but in a hamlet.

"IT is commended to every friend of the Rural Advance as a well-considered, practical and disinterested endeavour to reinforce and co-ordinate the forces of Rural Progress, and to throw light on the path which the Forward Movement is taking.

"THE COUNTRYMAN is started as a duty at a period when, throughout the world, more thought is being given than ever before to Rural Problems, and the opportunity of making progress was never brighter. The Editor's belief is that it is within the power of a Review which is the product not only of the convictions and zest of the rural dweller but of a lifetime's journalistic experience, to do more than occasional press writing and authorship, and platform talking can effect towards making Rural Life what it ought to be, and can be, within our time.

"IF the Editor is heartened by a cordial, prompt response, by the thousands who feel deeply how much is within our reach for Rural Civilisation, by means of knowledge, effort and unity, he will esteem himself honoured to have the privilege of giving for the rest of his life, such experience and technical skill as he has acquired to the service of THE COUNTRYMAN."

AFTER taking such long extracts from the Editor's opening article, we can but recommend, without summarising, the brief and bright articles—three dozen or thereby—which already express the Editor's aims. Mr. Robertson's well earned authority and influence has brought him contributors of the best: Lord Ernle, Sir Francis Acland, Noel Buxton, Sir Daniel Hall, yet he is open to unknown writers also and to art. Perhaps the best bit of country life it contains is van Anrooy's drawing of the old folk-dance fiddler, half-sorrowful and half-whimsical, stiff with age, but ready still to play for the young folks' dance.

THUS the editor has got together a large number of writers, whose say is generally to the point, and sound. But we miss a sense of unity of aim. The editorial notes, which might do much to being these contributions together and point out the significance of one article, or the relations between two others, seem written with the idea that they must compensate for any heaviness of other matter by being bright, disconnected and "chatty." We feel that this is the way of the town journalist, not of the true countryman. For the countryman's strength is the continuity in his way of working and his way of thinking. Nevertheless, with this one criticism, one welcomes THE COUNTRYMAN, not only for two or three really able articles but for its courage and its high aims—a first-rate beginning that needs and will reward all the support that studious as well as practical minds can give.

PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY: The Study and Treatment of the Individual Delinquent: by Edwin J. Cooley, Chief Probation Officer, Court of General Sessions, New York City. Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of New York. 1927.

A CONSTANT stream of good books for the penal reformer comes from America; and perhaps this is one of the most important. It is a kind of report or manifesto, explaining the methods and expounding the ideals of the Catholic Charities Probation Bureau after its short but highly successful career with the New York Court of General Sessions written by its Chief. This was a piece of voluntary work or "private enterprise" undertaken by the New York Catholic Charities "in order to place in practice the highest possible standards and ideals of probation work" (p. viii.), in the hope that the work would be taken up by the authorities at the public expense. This has actually been done as from 1st January, 1927.

THE official organ of the New York State Probation Commission wrote that "the best probation work for adult offenders to be found in the United States is done by this Bureau" (p. xi.), so presumably we may say that it is the best in the world. At any rate the perusal of some parts of this book is calculated to excite envy and patriotic shame in the most complacent Briton. Here is described something, I fear, not to be found in this island. Yet we ought to have something like it in every large town.

THE staff of the Bureau included the Chief Probation Officer, a Supervisor of Investigations, a Supervisor of Case Work, the Probation Officers (30 in number, it seems), an Employment Counsellor, Clinical Service, a Registrar and "an adequate clerical and stenographic staff." The probation officers were all college graduates and experienced in various branches of social work. THE book contains a certain amount of repetition, a fault quite on the right side. And one can understand that so busy a man as Mr. Cooley should not have found time to condense. Anyone who looks for careful statistics of results will be disappointed; and there seems to be a little confusion over some of the few figures that are given. We read on p. 86 that from January 1st, 1925, to November 1st, 1926 (22 months, not 23 as stated on the previous page) 3,053 social investigations were made, and in several places we are told that only 18 per cent. of them were placed on probation. That would give about 550 probationers all the time. Yet on p. 314 we read in an extract from a *Survey* article of June 15th, 1926, when, presumably, not all the 3,053 investigations can have been made, that "at present, the probationers under the Bureau number 839 men and 50 women." According to the same article the Bureau claimed "that 85 per cent. of the men and women who have completed their probationary period under its direction have been rehabilitated and satisfactorily adjusted to the community." Some of our probation officers would not think 85 a very out of the way percentage of successes, especially with so little time for relapses, but perhaps the different standards should be taken into account. Then 18 looks like a very cautious percentage of cases placed on probation, even though we remember that this court deals with serious offences, even up to murder, it seems.

HOWEVER, the value of this book does not lie in statistics or tabulated results, but in its exposition of "the standards and methodology of probation practice employed" by the model Probation Bureau, in other words, its efficient organisation and methods of investigation and remedial supervision; also in its general programme for treatment of offenders and prevention of

crime. No probation officer or person connected with the administration of criminal law and bent on perfecting its methods, to use a hackneyed phrase, can afford to neglect this work.

HERE are a few passages which will indicate something of the standards by which probation work was judged in this Bureau:

> GIVING the offender another chance is not probation. It is highly probable that he has already been given too many chances, and such a conception places upon him a responsibility in which he has usually lamentably failed. Showing his incapacity for self-direction by his anti-social conduct, the offender is evidently in need of a vital, inspiring, constructive force in his life of which he has previously been deprived. This is the task of the probation officer, and it is seen from it that probation is not so much supervision as it is intensive rehabilitative co-operation. Understanding and guidance, not repression and exhortation, are its keynotes. (p. 33.)
>
> NO plan of adjustment could be ultimately successful unless the probationer were convinced of its desirability and value and came to adopt it as his own. (p. 120.)
>
> IN this placement work, the objective was to plan for the probationer an industrial career rather than merely to place him in a temporary job. (p. 129.)
>
> NO matter how mean or hideous a man's life is, the first thing is to understand him; to make out just how it is that our common human nature has come to work out in this way. (p. 55. Quoted from C. H. Cooley's HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER.)
>
> THE mind and heart of every probation worker in the country should be consecrated to the task of enlarging his vision and of improving the processes whereby the most effective results can be obtained. (p. 441.)
>
> SOCIAL workers and probation officers should remember always that they are the torch bearers of that truth which Dean Pound has called "the most important change in the century,—the transference of the sense of value from property to humanity." (p. 443.)

UNDER the heading of "Standards for Effective Probation Work," the author enumerates 63 items, which should be read, marked and learned by probation workers. Suffice it here to write down No. 33: "Every phase of the supervisory process should be directed toward the permanent rehabilitation of the delinquent. The probation bureau should squarely accept the responsibility for the permanent restoration of the probationer in the community as a socially useful citizen." (p. 324.)

THE investigations carried out by the Probation Department (investigating officers and supervising officers were in separate divisions in this Bureau) were not only used for purposes of probation. Their findings are sent on to institutions to which the person whose case is investigated is committed. They also, of course, are used by the Court. Mr. Cooley especially recommends such investigation as useful in murder or manslaughter cases. Also in rape cases, "it is necessary to make a thorough investigation of the antecedents, character and circumstances of the girl involved, as well as of the defendant." (p. 256.)

THE author maintains that many reformable offenders need institution treatment, and that unreformable ones should be permanently segregated. He does not go into detail on the nature of institutional regimes, but he does

assert that "punishment as an end in itself must be eschewed. Discipline must be substituted for punishment and administered wisely." (p. 386.) It is not quite clear what is meant here by discipline; but perhaps this is as near as we can expect one who has long been in close co-operation with legal institutions to the recognition of the fact that to deal justly and effectively with criminals we have to get rid of the idea that they must be punished. On the whole, punishment is incompatible with right education (except, possibly, as incidental to some corrective purpose acquiesced in by the educated as a reminder, or perhaps to help him to exert his will).

No mention is made of the aid for discipline, esprit de corps, and other purposes of such individual and collective responsibility as was practised in the prisoners' Mutual Welfare League. Under such a system probably prisoners themselves would give excellent advice in the selection of their fellow members for discharge or parole.

PROBABLY parole would not always be necessary after an efficient rehabilitational regime. But it is curious that so little reference is ever made to the late Massachusetts Hospital for Inebriates under Dr. Neff, with its out-patient department preparations for discharged patients, stations dotted about the Commonwealth for out-patients and encouragement to those who needed it to return to hospital. It has long seemed to the present writer that, *mutatis mutandis*, this would make a fine model for a reformative institution.

MR. COOLEY sketches a still more comprehensive programme of prevention, going right down to pre-natal care. Perhaps, and naturally if it is so, the thought here is a little too occupied with the idea of preventing crime; though I am sure that he would agree that his end would be better served by concentrating on the positive aim of "as full a life as possible for everyone," though that sounds, and indeed is, very revolutionary!

ONE reads a book like this with its terrible glimpses of human failures, and one thinks, "the pity of it!" How much of all this trouble might have been saved. "Why is this human waste permitted?" the author asks. Why, indeed? As indicated in one of his cases, if society had been as interested in these people before they fell into crime as it was in some of them after they fell, there would not have been so much wreckage to salve. If only we were interested enough in all our children to care for them properly from birth, and before birth, how would there be any criminal problem at all? Better still, we might all enjoy lives worth living.

THERE are a number of useful Appendices, including an extensive bibliography, probation laws of New York State and the Rules and Regulations of the new Probation Service of the Court of General Sessions of New York City. There are also a number of wonderfully apt quotations interspersed between the chapters. Among them is the following quoted from G. K. Chesterton's ST. FRANCIS OF ASSISI, showing the ideal approach to the delinquent:—

> WHAT gave him his extraordinary personal power was this; that from the Pope to the beggar, from the Sultan of Syria in his pavilion to the ragged robbers crawling out of the wood, there was never a man who looked into those brown burning eyes without being certain that Francis Bernardone was really interested in *him*; in his own inner individual life from the cradle to the grave; that he himself was being valued and taken seriously, and not merely added to the spoils of some social policy. . .

A. ST. J.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF CIVICS: by E. M. White. Syndicate Publishing Co., 3 and 4 King Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 126 pp. (Cloth, 2s. 9d.; leather, 3s. 3d.)

THE author of this little book has had considerable, varied and successful experience in presenting her subject to students, alike adult and adolescents. Herein she traces briefly the source of the institutions upon which good citizenship is based and shows their filiation and social significance. In clear and vivid outline she deals with the family, village, town, local government, English nationhood and culture, Parliament, laws, the British commonweal and industry. Typical citizens, historically sketched, add force and vitality to the work, the bibliographical references should be particularly useful. This able little introduction to Civics may be warmly commended to teachers and students.

B. B.

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